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NOTES 
EXTRACTING COMPASSION FROM CONFUSION:  
SENTENCING NONCITIZENS 
AFTER UNITED STATES V. BOOKER 
Francesca Brody*
 
 
A noncitizen facing a federal judge for sentencing confronts a 
demonstrably different future than an otherwise identical citizen.  
Deportation, immigration detention, harsher prison conditions, and a 
longer actual sentence may all await the noncitizen federal inmate.  The 
U.S. Courts of Appeals have disagreed as to whether a district judge can 
consider those consequences in crafting a sentence under the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines. 
This Note argues that the circuit split results from circuit courts’ varying 
appellate scrutiny of sentencing decisions after United States v. Booker.  To 
resolve the split, this Note encourages the U.S. Sentencing Commission to 
adopt an amendment to the Guidelines, thereby promoting uniformity 
among sentencing courts.  As an alternative, this Note argues that it is 
proper for sentencing courts to consider alienage under 18 U.S.C. § 3553. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Noe Ferreria was a thirty-nine year old permanent resident of the United 
States, having emigrated from Mexico at age fifteen.1
 
 1. See United States v. Ferreria, 239 F. Supp. 2d 849, 851 (E.D. Wis. 2002). 
  Gainfully employed 
as a truck driver and a “devoted father,” Ferreria lived with his five 
children, all U.S. citizens, and their mother, his companion of over a 
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decade.2  He entered the United States legally and had never before been 
convicted of a crime.3  Despite his twenty-five year history in the United 
States, when Ferreria pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine,4 his 
residency status subjected him to near certain deportation to Mexico at the 
conclusion of his prison sentence.5  Thus, in addition to the primary 
consequences of his conviction, Ferreria stood likely to be “kicked out”6 of 
the country that had become his home, “lose his family,”7 and be forced to 
return to a nation where he had not lived since childhood.8
Federal courts have disagreed as to whether these and other immigration 
consequences of a criminal conviction should be offset by a downward 
departure or variance from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) 
recommendation.  In United States v. Ferreria, the court found that the 
“extraordinary hardship” of deportation merited a downward departure from 
the sentence recommended by the Guidelines.
 
9  In so holding, Ferreria 
followed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,10 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,11 and several district courts,12 all of which 
permit consideration of immigration consequences in sentencing, but 
aligned against a bloc led by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, which counsels against such consideration in most—if not all—
circumstances.13
In creating the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Commission) and shaping 
the Guidelines, Congress was driven by the desire to increase uniformity in 
sentencing
 
14 and “secure nationwide consistency.”15  Thus, when courts 
diverge in their recognition of a basis for variance, the central purpose of 
the Guidelines is stymied.  Noncitizens make up forty-seven percent of 
defendants in federal court,16 and many will face deportation.17
 
 2. Id. at 855. 
 The 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. at 849. 
 5. See id. at 851; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (rendering deportable any 
alien convicted of a controlled substance offense). 
 6. Ferreria, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 853. 
 7. Id. at 855. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Id. at 856. 
 10. See United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 11. See United States v. Farouil, 124 F.3d 838, 847 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco-Soto, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1206 (D.N.M. 2005); 
United States v. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. 44, 44–45 (D. Mass. 1997). 
 13. See United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 645–47 (2d Cir. 1993); infra note 251 
and accompanying text; see also United States v. Wills, 476 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 14. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering the 
opinion of the Court in part). 
 15. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). 
 16. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT tbl.26 
(2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/ 
Quarterly_Sentencing_Updates/USSC_2010_Quarter_Report_4th.pdf.  Factoring out 
immigration offenses, 21.76% of offenders are noncitizens. See id.  The vast majority of 
these nonimmigration offenders face drug trafficking charges, with fraud charges a distant 
second. See id. 
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intermingling of immigration consequences with the modern federal 
sentencing scheme poses far-reaching questions to proponents of fair and 
consistent sentencing.18  For these reasons, in January 2010, the 
Commission sought public comments on whether it should amend the 
Guidelines to address these issues.19
This Note explains the legal conflict over consideration of the 
consequences of alienage in federal sentencing and argues that since United 
States v. Booker,
 
20 sentencing courts can consider the immigration 
consequences at issue.  Part I of this Note details the modern federal 
sentencing scheme, immigration law and policy, and the intermingling of 
these two fields when noncitizens are sentenced in federal courts.  Part II 
describes the split among federal courts as to the propriety of considering 
various immigration consequences when crafting a sentence.  Part III of this 
Note argues that the Guidelines should be amended to recognize 
deportability as a proper sentencing factor, and in the absence of such a 
reform, sentencing courts should consider the consequences of immigration 
under Congress’s command to mete out sentences that are “sufficient, but 
not greater than necessary”21
I.  THE FEDERAL SENTENCING SCHEME, IMMIGRATION LAW, AND THEIR 
OVERLAP 
 in furtherance of other explicit statutory 
sentencing goals. 
Part I.A examines modern federal sentencing from the promulgation of 
mandatory guidelines through the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal decision in 
United States v. Booker, and subsequent analyses of the advisory guidelines 
scheme.  Part I.B considers the contours of immigration law, describing 
who can be removed for what offenses, and touches upon the debate over 
the jurisprudential formalism that deportation is not a form of punishment.  
Part I.C describes the interaction between sentencing and immigration law 
and the particular burdens that noncitizen inmates face. 
 
 17. Per 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006), “drug trafficking crime[s]” are aggravated 
felonies, convictions for which noncitizens are deportable under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 18. See Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Dir., ACLU Wash. Legislative Office, to U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n 3–5 (Mar. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20100317/ACLU_Murp
hy_Comments.pdf [hereinafter Murphy Letter] (urging the Commission to adopt provisions 
for downward departures to address the effects of deportation and disparate treatment of 
noncitizen prisoners).  In December 2010 at the close of his term, New York Governor 
David Paterson granted pardons to several people whose convictions would have subjected 
them to deportation, a consequence the Governor felt was needlessly harsh. 24 Immigrants 
Pardoned by Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2010, at A23. 
 19. See Notice of Proposed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, 75 Fed. Reg. 3525, 
3531 (Jan. 21, 2010). 
 20. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 21. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). 
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A.  Federal Sentencing:  Courts, Congress, and the Commission 
This section describes the development of federal sentencing law in three 
central law-making bodies:  Congress, the Supreme Court, and the 
Commission.  As these bodies modify the allocation of sentencing power, 
the proper consideration of alienage consequences changes as well.  
1.  Judicial Discretion at Its Apex:  Pre-Guidelines Federal Sentencing 
Throughout U.S. history, the underlying rationale for meting out criminal 
punishment has shifted, and as the rationale shifts, so too does the 
sentencing process.22  From the outset of the American republic, criminal 
punishment had a retributive focus, and legislatures set the punishment for a 
particular crime.23  Gradually, retributive sentencing gave way to reform 
models.24  Thus, for a century prior to the enactment of the Guidelines, 
United States criminal systems used schemes of “indeterminate 
sentencing”25 where rehabilitation was the primary rationale for criminal 
punishment.26  Constrained only by statutory maximums and minimums, 
judges applied sentences with a great degree of discretion,27 and 
rehabilitated prisoners were released upon the decision of corrections 
officers, often many years before the expiration of the sentence the court 
had imposed.28  In the system of indeterminate sentencing, virtually no 
appellate review took place.29
One prominent critic, U.S. District Court Judge Marvin E. Frankel, 
criticized the “unchecked and sweeping powers” of judges in the 
indeterminate sentencing model, and called that discretion “terrifying and 
 
 
 22. See infra notes 23–28, 47 and accompanying text. 
 23. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1978) (describing the changing 
rationales for punishment in the United States from the late eighteenth century through the 
mid-twentieth century).  Capital punishment was quite common in the colonial era. See Alan 
M. Dershowitz, Criminal Sentencing in the United States:  An Historical and Conceptual 
Overview, 423 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 117, 125 (1976).  For lesser crimes, 
legislatures imposed fines, whippings, and time in the stocks. Id.  Incarceration was not 
typically employed as a post-conviction form of punishment until after the American 
Revolution. Id. 
 24. See Grayson, 438 U.S. at 46; Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion:  
The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 893 (1990). 
 25. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).  Sentences were indeterminate 
due to a parole board’s determination of when they would end, see id. at 365, and to judges’ 
ability to sentence a defendant to a broad range, such as ten years to life. See Dershowitz, 
supra note 23, at 128–29. 
 26. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363 (stating that pre-Guidelines sentencing was based on 
“a view that it was realistic to attempt to rehabilitate the inmate”); Nagel, supra note 24, at 
893 (describing the advent of rehabilitative punishment in 1870); cf. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, 
CRIMINAL SENTENCES:  LAW WITHOUT ORDER 7 (1973) (arguing that “legislators . . . have 
neglected even to sketch democratically determined statements of basic purpose”). 
 27. FRANKEL, supra note 26, at 5. 
 28. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364–65. 
 29. See Symposium, Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 259–60 (1962); 
Carissa Byrne Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Policy Decisions After Kimbrough, 
93 MARQ. L. REV. 717, 719 (2009). 
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intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of law.”30  
According to Judge Frankel, this discretion-laden scheme resulted in 
sentences that lacked uniformity, order, and equality.31  While the system 
sought to impose sentences that were individualized, according to Judge 
Frankel, the resulting punishments were instead the result of “character, 
bias, neurosis, and daily vagary.”32
2.  Congress Steps In:  The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
 
Concerns about excessive judicial discretion33 and unequal sentences for 
similarly situated defendants34 motivated the enactment of the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 (SRA).35  The SRA created the Commission, an 
independent agency in the judicial branch charged with establishing federal 
sentencing policy to “provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes 
of sentencing” and reduce “unwarranted sentencing disparities.”36  The 
SRA also spelled out duties of the Commission and indicated what factors it 
might consider in crafting a set of guidelines.37
Congress had three objectives in establishing the Commission and the 
Guidelines.  First, it sought to increase transparency in sentencing by 
avoiding the “implicit deception” that exists when a judge imposes a 
sentence and a parole board determines how much of that sentence is 
actually served.
 
38  Second, Congress pursued increased uniformity by 
narrowing the range of sentences imposed for similar conduct.39  Third, it 
intended that sentences be proportionate to the offense, with increasingly 
severe sentences for increasingly severe crimes.40
Congress articulated several traditional goals of sentencing in the SRA.  
A sentence should:  (1) punish the offender, reflect the gravity of the 
 
 
 30. FRANKEL, supra note 26, at 5. 
 31. See id. at 8–9. 
 32. Id. at 21.  Another judge argued that, in the system of indeterminate sentencing, 
judges generally “behaved badly”—that is, they imposed sentences intended to rehabilitate 
and deter without any objective basis for their calculation. Nancy Gertner, Sentencing 
Reform:  When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 ME. L. REV. 569, 572 (2005). 
 33. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 292–93 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in 
part) (noting that “[t]he elimination of sentencing disparity, which Congress determined was 
chiefly the result of a discretionary sentencing regime, was unquestionably Congress’ 
principal aim” in enacting the SRA). 
 34. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365 (1989). 
 35. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3551–3742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998); see also Preliminary Observations of the 
Commission on Commissioner Robinson’s Dissent, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,046, 18,133 (May 13, 
1987) (noting that Judge Frankel’s criticism of disparity spurred sentencing reform). 
 36. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006). 
 37. Id. § 994. 
 38. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2010).  Under the system of 
indeterminate sentencing and parole, inmates typically served only one-third of their 
sentences. See id.; see also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key 
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (describing 
Congress’s purposes in passing the SRA). 
 39. U.S.S.G. § 1A1.3; Breyer, supra note 38, at 4–5. 
 40. See U.S.S.G. § 1A1.3; Nagel, supra note 24, at 905. 
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offense, and maintain respect for law,41 (2) deter future offenses,42 (3) 
protect the public,43 and (4) provide the offender with correctional or 
educational treatment.44  Under the “parsimony principal,”45 an offender’s 
term should be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to accomplish 
those ends.46
The resulting Guidelines shifted focus away from rehabilitative rationales 
in sentencing and, some argue, toward retributive rationales.
 
47  Others fault 
the Guidelines for failing to adopt one single dominant rationale among the 
several articulated.48  The Commission itself stated that the choice of a 
single guiding philosophy was “unnecessary.”49  Notwithstanding, the 
Commission has a continuing obligation to update the Guidelines to accord 
with evolving understandings of criminal justice50 and takes particular 
notice of circuit splits in promulgating amendments.51
The history of the Guidelines can be split into two major phases:  pre-
Booker and post-Booker.  From their enactment in 1987 through 2005, the 
Guidelines were mandatory and judges were required to impose a sentence 
within the Guidelines range unless a specific provision for departure 
applied.
 
52
 
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
  In 2005, the Supreme Court held in Booker that the mandatory 
Guidelines were unconstitutional, and rendered them advisory to preserve 
 42. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B). 
 43. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). 
 44. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). 
 45. See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 68 (2005) 
(describing parsimony as “a preference for the least severe alternative that will achieve the 
purposes of the sentence”). 
 46. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also Frase, supra note 45, at 82 (noting that § 3553(a) 
expresses the parsimony principal). 
 47. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2006) (“The Commission shall insure that the guidelines 
reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the 
purpose of rehabilitating the defendant . . . .”); Ricardo J. Bascuas, The American 
Inquisition:  Sentencing After the Federal Guidelines, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 6–7 
(2010) (arguing that the Guidelines repudiated rehabilitation as the primary function of 
incarceration, and elevated retribution to the dominant sentencing rationale). 
 48. See Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules:  Finding 
and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 
26 (2003). But cf. Dershowitz, supra note 23, at 122 (noting the utility of imprisonment as a 
form of crime reduction because it “conveniently combines” mechanisms for the various 
goals of punishment). 
 49. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2010). 
 50. Congress has instructed the Commission, in consultation with other federal legal 
organizations, to “periodically” review the Guidelines, and the Commission may submit 
amendments each spring, which become effective if Congress does not object to them. See 
28 U.S.C. § 994(o)–(p). 
 51. See Notice of Proposed Priorities, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,927 (July 19, 2010) (indicating 
that the resolution of conflicting interpretations of the Guidelines is a Commission priority).  
The Commission has recently addressed certain immigration-related departures. See infra 
notes 183–185 and accompanying text. 
 52. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2006), invalidated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005); see also Symposium, Federal Sentencing Under “Advisory” Guidelines:  
Observations By District Judges, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 6 (2006) (statement of Hon. Nancy 
Gertner) (“Over time, judicial departures were seen as a lack of compliance with the 
Guidelines.”). 
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their adherence to the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee.53  Booker 
required that a sentence be informed not only by the Guidelines range but 
also by the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).54  Through both phases, 
the proper calculation of a Guidelines sentence remained the same,55 but the 
influence of that calculation on the ultimate sentence decreased.56
3.  The Guidelines Computation, Departures, and Variances 
  In the 
Guidelines’ three-decade history, the Court and Congress have modified the 
level of appellate scrutiny of a sentence several times. 
The Guidelines lay out a step-by-step process to usher sentencing judges 
to a recommended range.57  A judge calculates a score by determining the 
“offense level”58—based on the crime committed with adjustments for 
certain factors, such as whether the defendant played a major or a minor 
role in the offense59—and a “criminal history” score, which considers the 
prior offenses of the defendant.60  The judge arrives at an offense score 
between one and forty-three, and a criminal history categorization between 
one and six.61  A sentencing table62 provides a narrow63
As enacted, the Guidelines were mandatory.
 recommended 
sentence range based on the combination of these two scores. 
64  A court was required to 
sentence within the Guidelines recommendation unless one of two 
situations permitting departure existed.65  First, if a Guidelines-based 
provision for departure applied, the court could decrease a sentence on that 
basis.66  Otherwise, a judge could depart upon finding that aggravating or 
mitigating factors made a case fundamentally different from what the 
Guidelines contemplated67—that is to say, the case fell outside the 
“heartland.”68
 
 53. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 226–27 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in 
part). 
  Regardless, the Commission expected departures to be 
 54. See id. at 245–46 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part); 
Symposium, supra note 52, at 4 (statement of Hon. Lynn Adelman). 
 55. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). 
 56. See Symposium, supra note 52, at 4 (statement of Hon. Lynn Adelman) (noting that 
with Booker, the primary sentencing focus shifted from the Guidelines to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)). 
 57. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2010). 
 58. Id. § 2. 
 59. Id. § 3B1.2. 
 60. Id. § 4A1.1. 
 61. Id. § 5A. 
 62. Id.  According to one district judge, under the mandatory Guidelines scheme, “the 
grid was God.” Symposium, supra note 52, at 4 (statement of Hon. Lynn Adelman). 
 63. U.S.S.G. § 1A1.2. 
 64. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006) (stating that a “court shall impose a sentence” in 
compliance with the Guidelines). 
 65. See id. 
 66. See U.S.S.G. §§ 5K1.1, 5K2.1–.24 (providing bases for upward and downward 
departures, including substantial assistance to authorities, the use of a dangerous weapon, 
and diminished capacity). 
 67. See id. § 5K2.0. 
 68. Id. § 1A4(b); see Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 93 (1996) (citing U.S.S.G. 
§ 1A4(b)) (describing the Guidelines’ applicability as reaching a “heartland” or a 
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rare.69  The SRA instituted a multi-pronged scheme of appellate review, 
with varying levels of scrutiny applying depending on the type of deviation 
from the Guidelines range.70
The Guidelines do not discuss alienage consequences as sentencing 
factors,
 
71 however recent modifications have increased the focus on 
alienage.72  While national origin is explicitly prohibited from 
consideration,73 alienage and deportability are not.74
4.  The Tug-of-War Continues:  Judicial and Legislative Reactions to the 
Guidelines 
 
Since their inception, the Guidelines have faced serious legal 
challenges.75  In the Guidelines’ lifespan, their model for federal sentencing 
has witnessed a tug-of-war between various loci of sentencing power—the 
legislative and judicial branches, depending on the higher prioritization of 
uniformity or judicial discretion,76 and, relatedly, between trial and 
appellate courts, in determining the proper amount of appellate scrutiny for 
the sentence imposed.77  Per the Commission’s mandate,78 the Guidelines 
are regularly amended to better suit evolving criminal justice standards.79
 
representative set of cases, and leaving sentencing judges the discretion to depart when 
particular factors make a case “unusual”). 
 
 69. U.S.S.G. § 1A1.3 (“Relevant distinctions not reflected in the guidelines probably 
will occur rarely and sentencing courts may take such unusual cases into account by 
departing from the guidelines.”). 
 70. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 308 & n.7 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting 
in part). 
 71. See United States v. Lopez-Salas, 266 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Other than for 
crimes related directly to alien status, such as illegal re-entry into the country, the guidelines 
do not mention the effects of alien status as a departure factor.”).  This Note addresses 
convictions for nonimmigration crimes.  Because immigration crimes are generally 
committed by noncitizens who are likely to face immigration consequences, courts have 
found that the Guidelines implicitly take those consequences into consideration. See, e.g., 
United States v. Garay, 235 F.3d 230, 233 & n.15 (5th Cir. 2000).  Thus, those offenses and 
offenders are outside the scope of this Note. 
 72. See infra Part I.A.5. 
 73. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10. 
 74. See United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 643–44 (2d Cir. 1993), for the 
distinction between considering national origin and alienage. 
 75. For example, in 1989, the Supreme Court held that the Guidelines were 
constitutional on separation of powers and non-delegation grounds. See Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). 
 76. See Statements of Sens. Kennedy and Leahy Supporting the JUDGES Act, 15 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 372, 372 (2003) (statement of Senator Kennedy in support of repeal of portions 
of the Feeney Amendment to return discretion to sentencing judges); see also United States 
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part) 
(“We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a 
sentence within a statutory range.”). 
 77. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98–100 (1996) (noting the Government’s 
position that more stringent appellate review furthers the goal of uniformity); In re 
Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“In effect, primary sentencing authority 
is shifted to the appellate judges whenever a trial court provides a lower sentence than do the 
Guidelines matrices.  For a judge to exercise what amounts to original power to sentence 
without actually seeing the person being sentenced is contrary to American tradition, as 
recognized in Koon.”). 
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i.  Initial Responses to the Mandatory Guidelines 
Nine years after the Guidelines went into effect, the Supreme Court 
significantly increased district court discretion.  In Koon v. United States,80 
the Court held that so long as a factor is not expressly prohibited in the 
Guidelines, it may be considered for a downward departure.81  By weighing 
in on how to interpret silence in the Guidelines, the Court widened 
sentencing courts’ ability to depart.82  The Court clarified that the 
Guidelines only intend to reach a “heartland” of cases, and departures may 
be appropriate for cases outside of that paradigmatic set.83  The Koon Court 
noted that the SRA “authorizes [departure] in cases that feature aggravating 
or mitigating circumstances of a kind or degree not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Commission.”84  Furthermore, the Court held that 
sentencing decisions should receive abuse of discretion review on appeal.85
ii.  The PROTECT Act 
 
In 2003, Congress drastically altered sentencing procedure with the 
Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children 
Today Act (PROTECT Act).86  Primarily aimed at targeting the sexual 
exploitation of children, the PROTECT Act also contained the Feeney 
Amendment,87 which aimed to further increase sentence uniformity and 
decrease judicial discretion.88  The resulting legislation limited courts’ 
ability to depart downward, instituted de novo appellate review of 
downward departures, required reports to Congress for downward 
departures, and forbade the Commission from adding any new grounds for 
departure to Chapter 5K for two years.89
 
 78. See supra notes 
  Despite its otherwise hard line 
against downward departures, the PROTECT Act also endorsed early 
50–51 and accompanying text. 
 79. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A2 (2010); supra note 50. 
 80. 518 U.S. 81 (1996). 
 81. Id. at 94. 
 82. See id. at 96. 
 83. Id. at 93–94 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A4(b) (1995)). 
 84. Koon, 518 U.S. at 94; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0, cmt. 
n.3 (2010). 
 85. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 100; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006) (setting out the bases 
for appeal and standards of review for various sentencing decisions). 
 86. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. 
Titles 18, 21, 28, 42, and 47). 
 87. Id. § 401, 117 Stat. at 667 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3742 and 28 U.S.C 
§§ 991, 994 (2006)). 
 88. See Tom Feeney, Reaffirming the 1984 Sentencing Reforms, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 
383, 385 (2004) (indicating that the purpose of the Feeney Amendment was to decrease the 
rate of downward departures and reduce disparities in sentencing). 
 89. See § 401, 117 Stat. at 673–76; see also Mark H. Allenbaugh, Who’s Afraid of the 
Federal Judiciary?  Why Congress’ Fear of Judicial Sentencing Discretion May Undermine 
a Generation of Reform, THE CHAMPION, June 2003, at 6, 8 (calling the Feeney Amendment 
a sentencing “coup d’état”).  One district judge resigned in protest to the changes that, in his 
view, were unjustly rigid and designed to intimidate sentencing judges into sentencing 
within the Guidelines. See John S. Martin, Jr., Op-Ed., Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A31. 
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disposition, or “fast track,” programs.90  Under those programs, U.S. 
Attorneys in certain specified border states had authorized downward 
departures for those charged with illegal reentry in exchange for a waiver of 
certain procedural rights.91
iii.  United States v. Booker 
 
Congress’s effort to limit judicial discretion was largely undone, 
however, with the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in United States v. 
Booker.92  The Court issued two majority opinions in Booker.93  The first, 
known as the “merits opinion,” was written by Justice John Paul Stevens, 
and held that mandatory guidelines violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to trial by jury.94  The Court held that by requiring a sentencing judge 
to find facts beyond those that the jury used to convict, and by calling for 
judges to increase sentences on the basis of facts not found beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the Guidelines interfere with the jury trial right.95  Justice 
Breyer’s “remedial opinion” determined that congressional intent counseled 
severing and invalidating the mandatory provisions to make the Guidelines 
advisory, thereby avoiding the constitutional issue.96  The full Court agreed 
that a sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion does not violate the Sixth 
Amendment in the way that mandatory application of facts does.97
Booker’s effect was thus to allow a sentencing court to consider the 
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 in addition to the properly 
calculated Guidelines range.
 
98  Accordingly, a post-Booker sentencing court 
has more options than a pre-Booker court.  It can sentence within the 
Guidelines range, depart from the Guidelines as before, or apply a variance 
under § 3553(a).99
 
 90. See § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. at 675; U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5K3.1 (2010). 
  Therefore, the law on Guidelines departures from before 
 91. See Thomas E. Gorman, Comment, Fast-Track Sentencing Disparity:  Rereading 
Congressional Intent to Resolve the Circuit Split, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 479, 489–90 (2010) 
(arguing that fast track sentencing’s better allocation of resources reduces disparity because 
far fewer cases of illegal reentry go unprosecuted). 
 92. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 93. Five Justices joined each opinion, and Justice Ginsburg was the only Justice to join 
both.  The four other Justices that joined the “merits opinion”—the opinion that decided that 
the mandatory Guidelines were unconstitutional—all dissented from the remedial opinion—
the portion that rendered the Guidelines advisory—and vice versa. See id. at 226, 244, 272, 
313, 326; Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker:  Advisory Guidelines in the Federal 
System, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 341, 345–46 (2006) (describing the makeup of the “dueling 
majorities”). 
 94. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226–27 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). 
 95. Id. at 232, 244. 
 96. Id. at 245–46 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). 
 97. Id. at 233 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part) (“[W]hen a trial 
judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the 
defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.”). 
 98. Id. at 245–46 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). 
 99. See supra notes 66–68, 98 and accompanying text.  Since Booker, the viability of the 
“departure” terminology has been questioned. See Thomas Withers, Supreme Court—
Defendants Not Entitled to Notice of Variance from Guideline Sentence, FED. CRIM. DEF. 
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Booker remains valid, but following Booker, a factor that did not form the 
basis for a departure may nonetheless justify a downward variance.100
A variance is a divergence from the Guidelines recommendation based 
on factors outside the Guidelines framework.
 
101  Section 3553(a) requires 
determining a sentence with a view toward Congress’s purposes of 
punishment.102  Thus, under advisory Guidelines, courts must consider “the 
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics” 
of the offender103 and the various types of sentence available,104 including 
imprisonment, fines, or probation.  The court must take account of “the 
need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities”105 among similarly situated 
defendants.106
The Booker opinions do not provide a clear mandate to district courts.
 
107  
While the merits opinion in Booker has been interpreted to give judges carte 
blanche to vary from the Guidelines,108
 
BLOG (June 15, 2008, 5:00 PM) http://www.federalcriminaldefenseblog.com/tags/variances/ 
(calling departures “a deceased creature” of the pre-Booker era).  However, as the language 
of departure remains in the Guidelines, this Note will use “departure” to refer to divergences 
from the Guidelines range that rely on the Guidelines themselves, and “variance” to 
distinguish divergences based on § 3553 dictates. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL 
REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 57 (2006), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony 
 under the remedial opinion, 
_and_Reports/Submissions/200603_Booker/Booker_Report.pdf. 
 100. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46. 
 101. See United States v. Castro-Rivas, 254 F. App’x 742, 743 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 102. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
 103. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 
 104. Id. § 3553(a)(3). 
 105. Id. § 3553(a)(6). 
 106. This seemingly simple command is not without controversy. Compare Breyer, supra 
note 38, at 13 (“Uniformity essentially means treating similar cases alike.”), with Kevin 
Cole, The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1336, 1336 (1997) 
(arguing that “disparity is not a self-defining concept” and for uniformity to have any 
meaning, it must be undergirded by a coherent philosophy of punishment). 
 107. See Graham C. Mullen & J.P. Davis, Mandatory Guidelines:  The Oxymoronic State 
of Sentencing After United States v. Booker, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 625, 631 (2007); see also 
Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 846 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Apprendi, 
Booker, Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough have given the lower courts a good deal to digest over a 
relatively short period.”).  It is worth noting that in addition to criticism, Booker has received 
praise as an improvement over the mandatory Guidelines regime. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES JANUARY 2010 THROUGH 
MARCH 2010 tbl.19 (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_
Projects/Surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.pdf [hereinafter JUDGES’ SURVEY] (finding that 
75% of district judges think that the post-Booker advisory Guidelines best achieve the 
purposes of sentencing, whereas 3% believe that mandatory Guidelines are better suited to 
those ends); Berman, supra note 93, at 343 (arguing that Booker’s changes mostly improved 
federal sentencing); Symposium, supra note 52, at 7 (statement of Hon. Nancy Gertner) 
(quoting Ryan S. King & Marc Mauer, Sentencing With Discretion:  Crack Cocaine 
Sentencing After Booker, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 134, 144 (2005)) (calling Booker an 
opportunity for more thoughtful and rational sentencing decisions). 
 108. See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“District 
judges are, as a result [of Booker and its progeny], generally free to impose sentences outside 
the recommended range.”). 
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sentencing courts are nonetheless required to consider the Guidelines109 and 
are subject to appellate review for procedural and substantive 
unreasonableness.110  These holdings create a tension that makes Booker 
difficult to apply.111
iv.  Understanding Booker:  Rita, Gall, Kimbrough, Spears, and Ice 
 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions aimed to clarify the post-Booker 
applicability of the Guidelines.  The Court sought to settle disagreements 
over the weight the Guidelines recommendation should carry112 and 
relatedly, the amount of appellate scrutiny that should be applied to a 
sentence outside of the Guidelines.113  The Court’s pronouncements 
generally indicated the breadth of the sentencing judge’s discretion to 
sentence outside the Guidelines based on factors that are not specific to a 
particular defendant.114
In Rita v. United States,
 
115 the Court held that a sentencing court may not 
presume that the Guidelines calculation is reasonable.116  An appellate court 
may apply a presumption of reasonableness,117 though importantly, courts 
of appeals may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness to sentences 
outside the Guidelines.118  Rita thus maintained the Guidelines’ overall 
relevance.119  In Gall v. United States,120 the Court found that a court of 
appeals may not set a circuit rule that requires “extraordinary 
circumstances” to warrant a departure from the Guidelines.121
On the same day that Gall was issued, the Court handed down its 
decision in Kimbrough v. United States.
  In other 
words, a sentencing court may issue a variance even though the case before 
it is a typical one. 
122
 
 109. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion 
of the Court in part). 
  In Kimbrough, the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia had issued a sentence below the 
Guidelines range, expressing disagreement with the inconsistent treatment 
of powder versus crack cocaine, and finding that the Guidelines 
recommendation was greater than necessary to satisfy Congress’s 
 110. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); Booker, 543 U.S. at 261. 
 111. See Berman, supra note 93, at 355 (“[T]he Supreme Court in Booker ultimately 
raised more questions than it answered concerning the day-to-day particulars of operating an 
advisory sentencing guideline system.”); David J. D’Addio, Sentencing After Booker:  The 
Impact of Appellate Review on Defendants’ Rights, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 173 
(2006). 
 112. See infra notes 115–34 and accompanying text. 
 113. See infra notes 144–62 and accompanying text. 
 114. See infra notes 125–28, 286 and accompanying text. 
 115. 551 U.S. 338 (2007). 
 116. Id. at 354–55. 
 117. Id. at 347. 
 118. Id. at 354–55. 
 119. See infra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 120. 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
 121. Id. at 47. 
 122. 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
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sentencing objectives.123  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
reversed, holding that it was “per se unreasonable” for the district court to 
vary from the Guidelines based solely on its disagreement with the 
underlying policy that the Guidelines espoused and the resulting disparity 
between crack and cocaine sentencing.124  The Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that a sentencing “judge may determine . . . that, in the particular 
case, a within-Guidelines sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ to serve the 
objectives of sentencing.”125  In other words, a court is entitled to read the 
broad dictates of the § 3553(a) factors to trump the Guidelines 
recommendation.126  The Court further noted that since Booker, “some 
departures from uniformity were a necessary cost” of honoring the Sixth 
Amendment through the newly-advisory scheme.127  The Court reiterated 
its point in Spears v. United States,128 stating that “district courts are 
entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack cocaine Guidelines 
based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines.”129
Adding to the current state of confusion, in 2009 the Court decided 
Oregon v. Ice,
 
130 which dealt not with the Guidelines, but with the Sixth 
Amendment’s influence on an Oregon statute allowing a judge to find facts 
for the imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences.131  The 
Court found that the statute did not violate the Sixth Amendment, deferring 
to the traditional province of the jury and to the state’s ability to craft its 
criminal law.132
 
 123. Id. at 92–93 (discussing the district court’s decision). 
  The Ice majority was apparently motivated by the nature 
of the particular statute that, in the Court’s view, constrained judicial 
discretion by requiring an affirmative finding before the imposition of 
consecutive sentences, rather than leaving consecutive sentences as a 
 124. United States v. Kimbrough, 174 F. App’x 798, 799 (4th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 552 U.S. 
85 (2007). 
 125. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)). 
 126. Kimbrough’s mandate remains debatable, however, as some courts have interpreted 
its grant of discretion broadly, to apply to all Guidelines, while others have interpreted it 
narrowly, applying only to the crack-cocaine provisions. Compare United States v. Corner, 
598 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 2010) (“We understand Kimbrough and Spears to mean that 
district judges are at liberty to reject any Guideline on policy grounds—though they must act 
reasonably when using that power.”), with United States v. Vandewege, 561 F.3d 608, 610 
(6th Cir. 2009) (Gibbons, J., concurring) (“Neither Kimbrough nor Spears authorized district 
courts to categorically reject the policy judgments of the Sentencing Commission in areas 
outside of crack-cocaine offenses, as the majority suggests.”), and Hessick, supra note 29, at 
718 (“Kimbrough tells appellate courts that they must allow district courts to categorically 
disagree with the sentencing policy underlying the crack cocaine Guideline, but it did not 
extend that holding to all Guidelines.  To the contrary, the Court cautioned that district court 
disagreements with other Guidelines may be subject to ‘closer review’ by the courts of 
appeals.”). 
 127. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 108. 
 128. 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009) (per curiam). 
 129. Id. at 843–44. 
 130. 129 S. Ct. 711 (2009). 
 131. See id. at 714. 
 132. Id. at 717. 
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potential default.133  The tension with Booker remains significant because 
the statute unambiguously permits a judge to unilaterally find facts used to 
increase a defendant’s sentence.134
v.  Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions 
 
The SRA originally laid out a multi-pronged scheme for the review of a 
sentence on appeal.135  In Koon, the Supreme Court held that appellate 
review should be for abuse of discretion.136  With the enactment of the 
Feeney Amendment, Congress indicated that all appellate review would be 
de novo.137  Congress’s purpose in heightening the level of appellate review 
was to encourage within-Guidelines sentences and discourage 
departures.138  De novo review did not last because in addition to excising 
the statutory provision that made the Guidelines mandatory,139 the Booker 
remedy also invalidated the mandatory portions of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), the 
SRA’s provision establishing a standard of review.140  The Court 
interpreted the remaining portions of the statute to call for reasonableness 
review on appeal.141
The level of appellate review is crucial to the implementation of advisory 
Guidelines.
 
142  With renewed discretion at the district level, one judge 
noted that appellate courts take on a vital role in “channel[ing] discretion” 
and policing “deviations from the norm.”143  However, Justice Scalia’s 
Booker dissent draws out the tension between appellate review and non-
mandatory Guidelines.144
 
 133. See id. at 719 (“It bears emphasis that state legislative innovations like Oregon’s 
seek to rein in the discretion judges possessed at common law to impose consecutive 
sentences at will.”). 
  On the one hand, increased appellate review may 
 134. See id. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the difficulty of reconciling Ice with 
previous Supreme Court sentencing decisions). 
 135. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 308 & n.7 
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). 
 136. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 99 (1996). 
 137. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 138. See Feeney, supra note 88, at 383. 
 139. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (indicating that the court “shall” sentence as per the 
Guidelines requirement, unless a basis for departure applies). 
 140. Booker, 543 U.S. at 260 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). 
 141. Id. at 260–61. 
 142. See Gerard E. Lynch, Letting Guidelines Be Guidelines (and Judges Be Judges), 
OSJCL AMICI:  VIEWS FROM THE FIELD 1, 5 (Jan. 2008), 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcl/blog/Articles_1/Lynch-final-12-28-07.pdf (“If an ideal 
sentencing system tries to limit disparity to that which is the inevitable cost of a reasonable 
method of discretion, appellate review of sentences that appear to go off the reservation is an 
important component of that system.”); id. (noting that “there are some cases in which the 
weight (however strong or slight) given to the guidelines will be the deciding factor” in 
calculating a sentence under advisory guidelines); Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing 
Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J. 1355, 1383 (1999) (book review) (suggesting that “appellate 
judges can serve as the coordinators for sentencing judges”). 
 143. James G. Carr, Some Thoughts on Sentencing Post-Booker, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 
295, 296 (2005). 
 144. Booker, 543 U.S. at 306 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (“If the Guidelines are no 
longer binding, one would think that the provision designed to ensure compliance with them 
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be a de facto limit on district court discretion.145  Yet where district courts 
have more discretion, closer appellate review becomes necessary if 
sentencing is to remain faithful to Congress’s goal of increased 
uniformity.146
Subsequent to Booker, the Court has added to the discourse on appellate 
review of sentencing in the advisory Guidelines scheme.  Although Gall 
rejected heightened scrutiny for sentences outside the Guidelines,
 
147 and 
recharacterized the level of appellate scrutiny as requiring abuse of 
discretion review,148 the precise nature of that review remains somewhat 
unclear.149  Several of the Court’s recent holdings elevate district court 
discretion but simultaneously contain language that seems to encourage 
scrutiny in appellate review.150
 
would, in its totality, be inoperative.  The Court holds otherwise.”); Hessick, supra note 
  For example, Kimbrough is frequently cited 
for recognizing district courts’ ability to deviate from the Guidelines based 
on a categorical disagreement—a disagreement with the Guidelines 
themselves instead of the circumstances a particular defendant presents, at 
29, 
at 717 (“Because appellate review is, by its terms, a limit on district court discretion, the 
Court’s post-Booker sentencing jurisprudence is inherently contradictory.”). 
 145. See Stephanos Bibas et al., Policing Politics at Sentencing, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1371, 
1371 (2009). 
 146. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing 
Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2008); see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 246 (Breyer, J., 
delivering the opinion of the Court in part) (noting the remedial opinion’s adherence to 
Congress’s intention of increased uniformity). 
 147. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). 
 148. Id. at 56; see also Hessick & Hessick, supra note 146, at 13–18 (discussing the 
difference between reasonableness review and abuse of discretion review). 
 149. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 26 (2009) (noting the development 
of circuit splits due to the appellate “courts’ continuing efforts to define their role in 
reviewing sentences for reasonableness in light of the Supreme Court’s opinions in Booker, 
Rita, Kimbrough, [and] Gall”); Hessick, supra note 29, at 717–18 (“Although obviously 
intended to clarify appellate review, the Court’s opinion in Kimbrough has actually led to 
additional confusion and created new circuit conflicts. . . . [B]ecause strict appellate review 
would ultimately eliminate district court discretion, the Court has had to twist the appellate 
process and issue opinions, like Kimbrough, that contain facially inconsistent statements.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 150. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 146, at 13 (“[P]ortions of Kimbrough and Gall 
appear to allow for more searching appellate review of sentencing decisions than the 
extremely deferential review, endorsed in other portions of those opinions . . . .”). Compare 
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007) (accepting the Government’s argument 
that “courts may vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely on policy considerations, 
including disagreements with the Guidelines”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted), and Gall, 552 U.S. at 46 (holding that a “rule requiring ‘proportional’ 
justifications for departures from the Guidelines range is not consistent with our remedial 
opinion in United States v. Booker”), with Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109 (“[W]hile the 
Guidelines are no longer binding, closer review may be in order when the sentencing judge 
varies from the Guidelines based solely on the judge’s view that the Guidelines range ‘fails 
properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations’ even in a mine-run case.” (quoting Rita v. 
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007))), and Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 (“We find it 
uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more significant justification 
than a minor one.”).  Ice, the Court’s most recent statement on sentencing, stands in stark 
contrast to the Guidelines cases because it extols the Oregon statute’s limitations on judicial 
discretion. See Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 719 (2009). 
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least with respect to crack and cocaine.151  Yet Kimbrough also counsels 
that, when a district court varies in a prototypical case based on its 
determination that the Guidelines do not reflect § 3553 considerations, 
“closer [appellate] review may be in order.”152  By concurrently granting 
wide, policy-driven discretion to district courts153 but making that 
discretion reviewable by appellate courts,154 the Supreme Court has issued 
arguably inconsistent instructions about the exercise of sentencing 
discretion.155
In 2009, approximately 8% of sentences were appealed
 
156 and of those, 
only 6.5% were reversed.157  But notably, when the government was the 
party challenging a sentence,158 the sentence was reversed 56.3% of the 
time.159  As one scholar points out, the government’s motive in bringing a 
criminal appeal is generally rooted in its desire to shape legal rules, rather 
than win individual cases.160  By appealing sentences, the government often 
seeks to modify the definition of “reasonableness” that governs review.161  
The fact that the government wins more than half of its challenges to 
district court reasonableness underscores the point of Booker’s critics—that 
the specter of reversal is a constraint on sentencing courts and may 
influence the policies those courts adopt.162
Over one quarter of the government’s appeals in 2009 challenged 
application of the § 3553 factors.
 
163  The terms of § 3553 are so broad,164
 
 151. See supra note 
 
however, that reversal for unreasonableness or abuse of discretion raises 
questions about how courts reach opposite conclusions when the same 
§ 3553 issue is raised.  Conflicting outcomes indicate that the appellate 
126. 
 152. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109. 
 153. See id. at 101. 
 154. See id. at 109. 
 155. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 156. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 149, at 33, 44 (2009) (reporting that 
6,507 sentences were appealed out of 81,372 reported cases). 
 157. Id. at 44. 
 158. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)(3) (2006) (granting the government the right to appeal a 
below-Guidelines sentence). 
 159. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 
tbl.56a (2009).  In contrast, when a defendant appealed a sentence, the sentence was reversed 
only 6.2% of the time. Id. at tbl.56. 
 160. See Andrew Hessick, The Impact of Government Appellate Strategies on the 
Development of Criminal Law, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 477, 479 (2009). 
 161. See id. at 488 & n.72 (citing Brief for the United States at 41, Claiborne v. United 
States, 551 U.S. 87 (2007) (No. 06-5618), 2007 WL 186287 at *41). 
 162. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 391 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“What 
works on appeal determines what works at trial . . . .”); Wright, supra note 142, at 1384 
(“[A]ppellate judges [should] select certain patterns they notice in trial court decision, and 
. . . cultivate those sentencing practices at the expense of others.”). 
 163. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 159, at tbl.58 (reporting that in sixty-four 
appeals, eighteen involved § 3553). 
 164. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 63 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the § 3553(a) factors “are so broad that they impose few real restraints on sentencing 
judges”). 
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courts may differ in the amount of scrutiny they apply to the variance 
analysis165 or may be injecting policy preferences into the calculus.166
vi.  The Relevance of Advisory Guidelines 
 
The Guidelines retain relevance after Booker for several reasons.  First, 
per Booker’s express command, sentencing courts must consider the 
Guidelines range in computing a sentence.167  The pre-Booker case law 
retains validity with regard to what constitutes a permissible departure, 
though after Booker, a district court can reduce a sentence based on a factor 
within the broad variance grounds but outside the narrow departure 
grounds.168  Courts continue to cite cases from before Booker, applying the 
logic of decisions that in turn rely on the formerly mandatory scheme, 
thereby keeping that reasoning relevant.169  Indeed, excluding government-
sponsored downward departures, judges still sentence within the Guidelines 
range nearly seventy-five percent of the time.170
Second, Booker’s internal inconsistencies render its guidance less than 
clear.
 
171  One scholar characterizes the Booker problem as creating a 
“fundamental tension between promoting adherence to the Guidelines 
without running afoul of the Sixth Amendment.”172  For a court unsure of 
Booker’s mandate, it is safe to sentence within the Guidelines173
 
 165. Compare United States v. Wills, 476 F.3d 103, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that 
deportation does not reduce the need for a sentence to incapacitate), with United States v. 
Ngatia, 477 F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that deportation does reduce the need for 
a sentence to incapacitate). 
 because 
 166. See Lynch, supra note 142, at 5 (arguing that appellate review should create a 
common law of sentencing that articulates what is “sensible” policy); Wright, supra note 
142, at 1383 (“Appellate courts take the lead in common-law development.  They identify 
trends, extrapolate general principles from the patterns they discern in particular cases, and 
require courts in their jurisdiction to adopt the chosen principles over other (perhaps equally 
sensible) competing principles.”). 
 167. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering the 
opinion of the Court in part) (remedying the Guidelines’ constitutional problem by 
“requir[ing] a sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges” and “permit[ing] the court to 
tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well”); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 
(stating that “the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark,” though 
not the only consideration, in crafting a sentence). 
 168. See supra note 99–100 and accompanying text. 
 169. See, e.g., United States v. Mendez, 362 F. App’x 484, 488 n.4 (6th Cir. 2010); Wills, 
476 F.3d at 107; United States v. Arroyo Mojica, 131 F. App’x 80, 82 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 170. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 16, at tbl.1.  Excluding the 25.7% of 
sentences affected by a Government-sponsored downward departure, 54.6% of the remaining 
74.3%, or 73.5%, of sentences fell within the Guidelines range. Id. 
 171. See John F. Pfaff, The Future of Appellate Sentencing Review:  Booker in the States, 
93 MARQ. L. REV. 683, 685 (2009). 
 172. Hessick, supra note 29, at 741. 
 173. See Bibas et al., supra note 145, at 1372.  As one district judge has pointed out, the 
Guidelines have been in place for a generation, and thus many federal judges have no frame 
of reference that does not involve a Guidelines determination of a sentence. See Nancy 
Gertner, Gall, Kimbrough and Me, OSJCL AMICI:  VIEWS FROM THE FIELD 1, 4 (Jan. 2008), 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcl/blog/Articles_1/Final2-Gertner-edit-1-18-08.pdf. 
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that sentence may earn particular deference on appeal174 and is less likely to 
be reversed.175
Booker.
  Justice Stevens admitted as much, stating, “I am not blind 
to the fact that, as a practical matter, many federal judges continued to treat 
the Guidelines as virtually mandatory after our decision in ”176
5.  Recent Immigration-Related Updates to the Guidelines 
 
The Guidelines have recognized certain ways that noncitizens’ 
experience in the criminal justice system varies from that of citizens.  In 
addition to sanctioning fast track sentences,177
Moreover, in January 2010, the Commission sought public comments on 
whether it should directly address alienage consequences in the 
Guidelines,
 the Commission has more 
recently enacted one amendment and proposed another that would lessen 
the particular burdens of sentencing on noncitizens. 
178 but did not include any such amendments in its 2010 
updates.  Many prominent groups have expressed opinions in favor of and 
opposed to an amendment.  For example, the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) urged the Commission to adopt the amendment, citing the 
longer, harsher prison terms that noncitizens serve and the unwarranted 
disparity that those conditions create.179
 
 174. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007); see also United States v. 
Sedore, 512 F.3d 819, 829 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (referring to sentencing 
courts’ post-Booker, effectively mandatory treatment of the Guidelines as “guidelinitis”). 
  Opponents of an amendment, 
including the Department of Justice and certain members of Congress, 
argue that the purpose of the SRA was to base criminal punishment on the 
crime committed and the offender’s criminal history, not personal 
 175. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 354 (acknowledging the defendant’s argument that a non-
binding appellate presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences may 
encourage judges to sentence within the Guidelines); Bibas et al., supra note 145, at 1387 
(noting that in circuits where the appellate court has adopted a Rita reasonableness 
presumption, the Guidelines provide a “safe harbor[]”); Alexandra A.E. Shapiro & Nathan 
H. Seltzer, Guidelines or Higher:  NYCDL’s Study of Reasonableness Review Reveals the 
Courts of Appeals’ Aversion to Parsimony, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 177, 180 (2007) (finding 
that between Booker and Rita, only one in over 1,500 within-Guidelines sentences was 
reversed on substantive grounds). 
 176. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 366 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 177. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Murphy Letter, supra note 18, at 2. 
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characteristics.180  However, proponents of an amendment note that § 3553 
already requires consideration of the offender’s personal characteristics.181
i.  Departure for Cultural Assimilation 
 
Under the 2010 Guidelines, noncitizens convicted of illegal reentry have 
the opportunity for additional lenience in sentencing.182  Section 2L1.2, 
under which those convicted of illegal entry are sentenced, contains a new 
application note that provides for downward departures for defendants who 
have significant ties to the United States.183  The application note states that 
a departure may properly be based on an offender’s family and cultural ties 
within the United States if that offender has lived in the United States since 
childhood.184  The departure is explicitly only available to those defendants 
whose “cultural ties provided the primary motivation for the defendant’s 
illegal reentry.”185
ii.  Departure for Stipulated Order of Deportation 
  Thus, on its face, it is unavailable to defendants charged 
with nonimmigration crimes or to legal residents. 
The Commission has proposed an amendment which would sanction a 
downward departure for a defendant who stipulates to an order of 
deportation.186  This proposal has not yet been adopted, and is being 
considered for inclusion in the Commission’s May 2011 updates.187  
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has indicated its support for 
this provision, arguing that it promotes judicial efficiency and fairness to 
offenders, particularly those charged with nonimmigration offenses.188
 
 180. See Letter from Lamar Smith, Ranking Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary, et 
al., to William K. Sessions, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 1 (Mar. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20100317/HouseSenate
%20Letter.pdf (noting the “strong opposition” of two Senators and seven Congressmen to 
Guidelines amendments that consider offender specific characteristics as inconsistent with 
Congressional intent in passing the SRA); Transcript of Public Hearing at 24, U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n (Mar. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20100
317/Hearing_Transcript.pdf (statement of Tristram J. Coffin, U.S. Attorney, Dist. of Vt.) 
(stating that further consideration of offender specific characteristics would “jeopardize 
uniformity”). 
  On 
the other hand, opposition to the proposal is premised on a concern that 
 181. See Letter from Julie Stewart & Mary Price, Families Against Mandatory 
Minimums, to William K. Sessions, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 10 (Mar. 22, 2010), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20100317/ 
FAMMComments%203-22-10.pdf; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006). 
 182. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.8 (2010). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See Notice of Final Priorities, 75 Fed. Reg. 54,699, 54,700 (Sept. 8, 2010). 
 187. See id. 
 188. Transcript of Public Hearing at 18–19, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (Jan. 20, 2010), 
available at http://ftp.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20100120/Public_Hearing_Transcript.pdf 
(statement of John T. Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement). 
2011] EXTRACTING COMPASSION FROM CONFUSION 2149 
defendants will be hurried into consenting to removal and waiving 
legitimate defenses.189
B.  Immigration Law and the Criminal Alien 
 
This section briefly describes modern immigration law, focusing on how 
criminal convictions affect noncitizens.  It also considers the tensions 
inherent in the doctrine that immigration law is civil and thus so is 
deportation, a formalism that results in a lack of full Sixth Amendment 
rights in removal proceedings,190 and treatment of immigration 
consequences as “collateral” and thus not relevant to sentencing 
decisions.191
1.  Congress’s Broad Removal Power 
 
Congress has plenary authority to determine who may enter the United 
States and who may not.192  In other words, under the traditional plenary 
power doctrine, legislative and executive decisions about immigration are 
largely insulated from judicial review.193  Modern immigration policy 
generally follows two primary goals in deciding whom to admit:  uniting 
family members and bringing qualified workers into the country.194  The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made the removal of 
noncitizens convicted of crimes a top priority in its enforcement regime.195
For the purposes of this Note, the terms “noncitizen” and “alien” are 
synonymous.  An alien is “any person not a citizen or national of the United 
 
 
 189. See id. at 36–37 (statement of John T. Morton, discussing the point of view of the 
immigration bar). 
 190. See infra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 191. See Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss:  Collateral Consequences, Silence, 
and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 124 (2009). 
 192. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587–88 (1952) (“The Government’s 
power to terminate its hospitality has been asserted and sustained by this Court since the 
question first arose. . . . [The Government’s ability to deport noncitizens is] a power inherent 
in every sovereign state.”); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (“The right to expel aliens 
is a sovereign power necessary to the safety of the country and only limited by treaty 
obligations in respect thereto entered into with other governments.”); Peter H. Schuck, The 
Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1984). But see 1 CHARLES 
GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1.03[2][a], 1.03[3][b] (2010) (noting that the plenary power doctrine has been limited but 
not overruled). 
 193. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:  
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 (1990). 
 194. Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1730 (2009) 
(citing ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP:  PROCESS & POLICY 297 
(6th ed. 2008)); see also Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (setting forth a preference system for 
immigration admissions with the categories “Family-Sponsored Immigrants,” “Employment-
Based Immigrants,” and a new category of “Diversity Immigrants”). 
 195. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 
to All ICE Employees 1–2 (June 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/civil_enforcement_priorities.pdf.  The 
memorandum also suggests that it might be appropriate to exercise prosecutorial discretion 
when dealing with lawful permanent residents, among others. Id. at 4. 
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States.”196  Any noncitizen is subject to immigration laws and as such is 
potentially subject to deportation.197  Congress has established many 
categories of legal aliens, only a few of which will be mentioned here.  A 
lawful permanent resident (LPR) is a person who has been “lawfully 
accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an 
immigrant.”198  LPRs are more casually known as green card holders.199  
LPRs fall within the legal category of “immigrant” because of their intent to 
reside permanently in the United States.200  Aliens also consist of 
nonimmigrant visa holders, including foreign students, and non-visa holders 
such as tourists from certain countries.201  Asylees202 and refugees203 are 
noncitizens granted legal status based on a fear of persecution.  Temporary 
protected status may be granted to groups of individuals, such as hurricane 
victims.204
Those who enter the United States illegally, or who entered legally but 
have otherwise violated the terms of their admission, for example by 
overstaying a visa, are illegal immigrants.
 
205
The Immigration and Nationality Act
 
206 sets forth six categories of 
deportable offenses.207  The only category relevant to this Note is 
deportability for criminal convictions.208
Several types of criminal convictions render a noncitizen removable.  
Primary among those are convictions for an “aggravated felony.”
 
209
 
 196. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 84 (9th ed. 2009), 
defining an alien as “[a] person who resides within the borders of a country but is not a 
citizen or subject of that country.”  The terms “immigrant” and “nonimmigrant” further 
distinguish aliens in that an immigrant intends to stay in the United States permanently, 
whereas a nonimmigrant does not intend to stay. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15); BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 817. 
  Many 
 197. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (“Any alien . . . shall . . . be removed if the alien is within 
one or more of the following classes of deportable aliens . . . .”); RICHARD A. BOSWELL, 
ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW 207 (2d ed. 2009). 
 198. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20). 
 199. MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY:  A GUIDE 
TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN-BORN DEFENDANTS 2 (3d ed. 2008). 
 200. See supra note 196.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) for the categories of exceptions to 
the definition of immigrant. 
 201. KRAMER, supra note 199, at 3–4. 
 202. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158. 
 203. See id. § 1157. 
 204. Id. § 1254a; KRAMER, supra note 199, at 6. 
 205. See KRAMER, supra note 199, at 8; infra note 208. 
 206. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–
1537). 
 207. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)–(6); AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, 
IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS:  A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 7:3 (4th ed. 2010).  Before 
the legal reforms in 1996, see infra note 224, the process by which a person was removed 
from the United States was called “deportation”; since 1996, the process is called “removal.” 
See 5 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 192, § 64.01[1]. 
 208. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).  The other classes of deportable aliens are those who:  (1) 
entered the country illegally or who entered legally but overstayed; (2) have “fail[ed] to 
register and falsif[ied] documents;” (3) are removable on “security and related grounds;” (4) 
become a “public charge” within five years of entry; or (5) vote illegally in any election. Id. 
§ 1227. 
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aggravated felonies are violent crimes,210 although “aggravated felony” is a 
term of art that Congress has defined to include a growing set of 
offenses.211  In addition, any alien convicted of a controlled substance 
offense212 or of certain firearm offenses213 is deportable.  Convictions for 
crimes of moral turpitude also form the basis for deportation.214  Crimes of 
moral turpitude may include arson, blackmail, embezzlement, forgery, and 
theft.215  Those convicted of one aggravated felony or more than one crime 
involving moral turpitude are ineligible for relief from removal.216
2.  The Civil Underpinnings of Removal Policy 
 
Traditional U.S. jurisprudence treats deportation as a basic correction of a 
wrong217 and embraces “the formalism that deportation of any type is never 
punishment for constitutional purposes.”218  Courts have adhered to the 
characterization of deportation as an administrative, non-criminal 
procedure.219
 
 209. The term “aggravated felony” includes crimes as diverse as murder, firearms 
trafficking, money laundering, and perjury. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), (C), (D), (S).  
The term is criticized as being both malleable and a misnomer, applying to offenses not 
generally considered aggravated or felonious. See Stumpf, supra note 
  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has stated on multiple 
194, at 1692–93, 1723. 
 210. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 207, § 7:3.2, at 7-107. 
 211. See BOSWELL, supra note 197, at 16–17. 
 212. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
 213. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(C). 
 214. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).  One scholar notes that a crime involving moral turpitude 
“defies any absolute definition, but has been described as a crime that has a mens rea 
requirement and involves conduct that is inherently base or vile, and contrary to the accepted 
rules of morality—essentially a crime that is per se or intrinsically wrong.” BOSWELL, supra 
note 197, at 50.  On the other hand, the Board of Immigration Appeals has defined crimes of 
moral turpitude as involving “a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk to 
the life or safety of others.” Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 572 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing cases).  
The State Department has noted that a crime of moral turpitude often involves elements of 
“fraud,” “larceny,” and “intent to harm persons or things.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS MANUAL 9 FAM 40.21(a) N2.2 (2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86942.pdf. 
 215. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 214, at N2.3-1(b). 
 216. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) & (b)(1)(C) (rendering an alien convicted of an aggravated 
felony ineligible for cancellation of removal); see FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 207, 
§ 7:3.2, at 7-115. 
 217. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (“The order of 
deportation is not a punishment for crime.  It is not a banishment, in the sense in which that 
word is often applied to the expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment.  It 
is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied 
with the conditions upon the performance of which the government of the nation, acting 
within its constitutional authority and through the proper departments, has determined that 
his continuing to reside here shall depend.”); see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 
580, 594 (1952); Garcia v. Holder, 320 F. App’x 288, 291 (5th Cir. 2009); Daniel 
Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment:  Some Thoughts About Why Hard 
Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1894–95 (2000) (stating that “our courts 
have long held that deportation proceedings are civil rather than criminal, and that 
deportation, however harsh it may be in practice, is not punishment,” and criticizing that 
doctrine as both tautological and counterintuitive). 
 218. Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation and Justice:  A Constitutional Dialogue, 41 B.C. L. 
REV. 771, 779 (2000). 
 219. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594. 
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occasions that “deportation may result in the loss ‘of all that makes life 
worth living.’”220  Thus, though formalism persists, it engenders 
scholarly221 and judicial222 resistance.  Nonetheless, removal proceedings 
are still treated as civil rather than criminal matters, and accordingly, the 
protections of the Sixth Amendment do not all attach.223
Congress enacted significant reforms to immigration law in passing the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA).
 
224  IIRIRA added new crimes to Congress’s list of aggravated 
felonies and removed various avenues of relief for noncitizen convicts 
facing deportation.225  Reacting to this expansion, and noting that the post-
1996 scheme makes the deportation of many noncitizen offenders 
“practically inevitable,” the Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky226 
opined that “[t]hese changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal 
law, deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important 
part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who 
plead guilty to specified crimes.”227  Moreover, the Padilla Court’s 
holding—that a noncitizen defendant can claim ineffective assistance of 
counsel where his attorney did not warn him that his conviction would 
likely lead to deportation228
 
 220. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 
U.S. 276, 284 (1922)). 
—rejected the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s 
view that deportation was a “collateral” consequence and that “those 
 221. See, e.g., Kanstroom, supra note 218, at 780–81 (“[E]ach ostensibly civil or 
collateral consequence should be considered on the merits to determine whether—under the 
circumstances in which it is imposed—it is punishment or not. . . . [because deportation] is 
uniquely punitive . . . .  The deportation of long-term, legal permanent residents for post-
entry conduct is imposed as a direct consequence of a prior ‘bad’ act.”); Robert Pauw, A New 
Look at Deportation as Punishment:  Why at Least Some of the Constitution’s Criminal 
Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 306 (2000) (mocking the 
traditional view of deportation as “nothing more than a polite mechanism for sending home 
individuals who do not quite live up to our standards and are not fit to be members of our 
community”). 
 222. See, e.g., Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1527 (3d Cir. 1996) (Sarokin, J., 
concurring) (arguing that for purposes of the Ex Post Facto clause, “[t]he legal fiction that 
deportation following a criminal conviction is not punishment is difficult to reconcile with 
reality”); Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 590 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that “[i]t 
defies common experience to characterize deportation of an alien such as petitioner as 
anything other than punishment for his crimes” and noting that Socrates chose death over 
exile), rev’d sub nom, Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 223. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038–39 (1984); Pauw, supra note 221, 
at 309 (noting that in deportation proceedings, a noncitizen does not have the right to a jury 
trial, the right to assistance of counsel, or the benefit of the exclusionary rule for illegally 
seized evidence). 
 224. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of Titles 8 
and 18 of the U.S. Code); see also 1 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 192, 
§ 2.04[14][c] (calling the new law “a major reconfiguring”). 
 225. BOSWELL, supra note 197, at 16–17. 
 226. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 227. Id. at 1480. 
 228. Id. at 1483. 
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matters [were] not within the sentencing authority of the state trial 
court.”229
C.  Sentencing Noncitizens:  Three Contours 
 
Noncitizen defendants challenge the effect of alienage on their sentences 
in three primary ways.  First, noncitizens convicted of particular crimes are 
very likely to be deported.230  As detailed in Part I.B, any noncitizen 
convicted of one aggravated felony or controlled substance offense, or of 
two crimes of moral turpitude, is ineligible for relief from deportation, and 
thus faces near certain removal from the country.231
Second, a noncitizen’s time incarcerated may be more burdensome than 
that of an otherwise identical citizen because the Bureau of Prison (BOP) 
blocks noncitizens’ access to two types of benefits.  The case law refers to 
this ineligibility generally as imposing harsher or more severe conditions of 
confinement.
 
232  First, noncitizens are automatically ineligible to serve their 
terms in a minimum security facility, the lowest security designation for 
federal prisons,233 because BOP policy mandates placement of noncitizens 
in low security facilities or higher.234  Congress has directed that the BOP 
“shall, to the extent practicable” place a prisoner in a facility that enables 
community readjustment, such as a halfway house, for up to one year at the 
end of his term.235  However, because inmates with ICE detainers are 
generally ineligible for minimum security facilities, they are ineligible for 
this more lenient end-of-sentence confinement.236
Relatedly, noncitizens may serve longer actual prison terms than 
otherwise identical citizens.  Those who undergo drug treatment in prison 
may be entitled to up to one year of early release for successful 
completion;
 
237
 
 229. Id. at 1481 (“[W]e find it ‘most difficult’ to divorce the penalty from the conviction 
in the deportation context.”). 
 however BOP policy renders inmates with ICE detainers 
 230. See supra notes 195, 209–16 and accompanying text.  The Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) cites a lack of resources as the primary reason that it is unable to remove 
each and every convicted, deportable alien. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., DETENTION AND REMOVAL OF ILLEGAL ALIENS OIG-06-33, at 14 (2006). 
 231. See supra notes 196–97, 206–16 and accompanying text. 
 232. See, e.g., United States v. Farouil, 124 F.3d 838, 847 (7th Cir. 1997); United States 
v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 233. “Minimum security institutions, also known as Federal Prison Camps (FPCs), have 
dormitory housing, a relatively low staff-to-inmate ratio, and limited or no perimeter 
fencing.  These institutions are work- and program-oriented . . . .” Prison Types & General 
Information, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 
http://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 23, 2011).  On the 
other hand, low security facilities “have double-fenced perimeters, mostly dormitory or 
cubicle housing, and strong work and program components.  The staff-to-inmate ratio in 
these institutions is higher than in minimum security facilities.” Id. 
 234. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT NO. 
P5100.08, INMATE SECURITY DESIGNATION AND CUSTODY CLASSIFICATION ch. 5, at 9 (2006). 
 235. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1) (Supp. 2010). 
 236. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 651 & n.2. 
 237. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 550.54(a)(1)(iv) (2010). 
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ineligible for early release.238  Several other categories of inmates are 
similarly disqualified, including inmates with convictions for homicide, 
rape, arson, or kidnapping; inmates who had previously been released under 
the treatment program; and contractual boarders.239
Third, Congress has granted the U.S. Attorney General the authority to 
detain a convicted noncitizen at the end of his term of imprisonment.
 
240  
Formerly, ICE did not begin deportation proceedings until the conclusion of 
a deportable alien’s prison term, but more recently, ICE has made efforts to 
begin proceedings earlier and decrease the time noncitizens spend in 
immigration detention following the end of their sentences.241  These 
efforts have helped, but have not eliminated the likelihood that a deportable 
alien may spend several extra months functionally imprisoned, in addition 
to the term to which he was sentenced.242  The BOP prohibits crediting 
immigration detention toward a prison sentence,243 but with an easy 
analogy to creditable time served,244
The courts’ treatment of the three main ways that alienage impacts 
sentences has created a circuit split, as courts have disagreed in their 
 courts are left to consider whether the 
sentence imposed should account for that time. 
 
 238. 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(1); see also Nora V. Demleitner, Terms of Imprisonment:  
Treating the Noncitizen Offender Equally, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 174, 176 (2009) (arguing 
that this program should be expanded to allow noncitizens to participate). 
 239. 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(2)–(7).  Contractual boarders include, for example, state 
inmates housed in federal prison.  Id. § 550.55(b)(3). 
 240. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2006) states:  “The Attorney General shall take into custody 
any alien who . . . is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in 
section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) [multiple criminal convictions for crimes involving moral 
turpitude], (A)(iii) [aggravated felonies], (B) [controlled substances], (C) [certain firearm 
offenses], or (D) [miscellaneous crimes] of this title . . . .”  The statute provides a narrow 
exception to mandatory confinement where release is necessary to protect a witness in an 
investigation. See id. § 1226(c)(2).  The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
detaining deportable aliens in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003). 
 241. See Martin Arms, Comment, Judicial Deportation Under 18 USC § 3583(d):  A 
Partial Solution to Immigration Woes?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 657 & n.26 (1997). 
 242. See id.; see also Transcript of Public Hearing, supra note 188, at 33–34 (statement of 
John T. Morton, Asst. Sec’y of Homeland Sec. for ICE) (noting that a “large number” of 
deportable federal inmates spend between forty days to a few months in civil detention 
pending deportation).  While immigration detention is technically a civil process, the 
conditions of detention centers often mirror those of prisons. See Anil Kalhan, Rethinking 
Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 43, 47 (2010), 
http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/110/42_Anil_Kalhan.pdf 
(discussing the severe conditions of immigration detention and the use of county jails to hold 
detainees). 
 243. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT NO. 
5880.28, CHANGE NOTICE SENTENCE COMPUTATION MANUAL 1-15A (1997); Demleitner, 
supra note 238, at 174. 
 244. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2006) (giving a person credit toward completion of a sentence 
for time served prior to the beginning of the sentence); STEPHEN R. SADY & LYNN 
DEFFEBACH, THE SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, AND THE NEED FOR 
FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING AMELIORATIVE STATUTES TO ADDRESS UNWARRANTED 
AND UNAUTHORIZED OVER-INCARCERATION 25–26 (2008), available at 
http://or.fd.org/symp2.final%20for%20pdf.pdf (arguing that the BOP’s rule prohibiting 
credit for time spent in immigration detention lacks any “conceivable justification”). 
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interpretations of how these factors interact with aspects of § 3553 and the 
Guidelines’ provisions for departure. 
II.  CONSIDERING THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALIENAGE IN SENTENCING 
The conflict over considering deportability in sentencing revolves around 
the three issues outlined in Part I.C.  First, courts differ over whether the 
deportation itself is, in some circumstances, so onerous that the defendant 
deserves a discounted sentence.245  Second, given certain legislative and 
administrative policies that govern the rights of incarcerated noncitizens 
compared to citizens, judges vary as to whether the resulting harsher 
conditions of confinement merit a downward departure for the noncitizen 
defendant.246  Third, because a noncitizen convict may face additional time 
in immigration detention following a prison term, a few courts have queried 
whether this increased detention warrants an offset.247
This circuit split first emerged in the mid-1990s, under the early period of 
the mandatory Guidelines scheme.  In 1993, the Second Circuit decided 
United States v. Restrepo,
 
248 holding that while departing downward in 
consideration of alienage was not barred per se, the factors that the 
defendant presented—likely deportation, more severe prison conditions, 
and additional immigration detention—did not suffice to justify a 
departure.249  The Restrepo court thus left very little room for consideration 
of alienage consequences because it rejected each of the factors that 
defendants typically raise.250  Several circuits explicitly adopted Restrepo’s 
logic.251  The D.C. Circuit, however, diverged from the Restrepo line of 
cases.  In United States v. Smith,252
 
 245. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1. 
 the court held that where a defendant 
faces more onerous terms of confinement due strictly to his alienage, that 
 246. See infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2. 
 247. See infra Parts II.A.3, II.B.3. 
 248. 999 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 249. Id. at 643–47. 
 250. See United States v. Mendoza, 576 F.3d 711, 722 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that 
defendant’s deportability and resultant conditions of confinement were “nothing other than [] 
stock argument[s] that [are] routinely, and increasingly, made to the district courts”); 
Restrepo, 999 F.2d at 647 (noting that a “large number” of federal defendants are subject to 
deportation); see also Murphy Letter, supra note 18, at 1–5 (describing the differences 
between citizens’ and noncitizens’ imprisonment under the categories of “Differential 
Conditions of Confinement and Prison Time Served” and “Severe Immigration 
Consequences”); cf. United States v. Simalavong, 924 F. Supp. 610, 613 (D. Vt. 1995) 
(finding defendant’s circumstances so atypical as to fall into Restrepo’s exception); infra 
notes 353–54 and accompanying text. 
 251. See United States v. Veloza, 83 F.3d 380, 382 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Nnanna, 7 F.3d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 7 F.3d 1483, 
1487 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 252. 27 F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
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increase in severity may be offset by a downward departure.253  Essentially, 
Smith found sufficient the factors that Restrepo rejected.254
After 1996, some courts argued that Koon obviated the split, as it 
recognized broad discretion for judges to depart downward.
 
255  Thus, 
Booker’s even wider grant of discretion could have eradicated the issue 
from the discourse entirely;256 however, that has not been the case, as the 
following sections elucidate.257
Since Booker made the Guidelines advisory in 2005,
 
258 sentencing courts 
have grappled with the proper application of the Guidelines and other 
sentencing factors.259  Following Booker, departures remain available for 
courts that find that the consequences of alienage are mitigating factors 
taking a case out of the heartland.260  Additionally, sentencing judges often 
see likely future deportation, and its attendant consequences for the 
noncitizen prisoner, as accomplishing some of § 3553’s goals, and thus 
incarceration is not the only source of punishment,261 incapacitation,262 and 
deterrence.263  Meanwhile, appellate courts review application of the § 
3553 factors for reasonableness and—either explicitly or implicitly—must 
determine the appropriate level of scrutiny applicable to non-Guidelines 
sentences.264
A.  Sentencing Courts Cannot Consider the Effects of Noncitizenship 
 
The Guidelines do not indicate whether alienage and deportability should 
play a role in sentencing, and thus since Booker, courts have addressed 
 
 253. Id. at 650. 
 254. See id. at 654–55; see also Susan L. Pilcher, Justice Without a Blindfold:  Criminal 
Proceedings and the Alien Defendant, 50 ARK. L. REV. 269, 327 & n.253 (1997) (noting that 
Smith accepted the “identical argument” that Restrepo rejected). 
 255. See, e.g., United States v. Garay, 235 F.3d 230, 233 & n.18 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting 
abrogation of Nnanna in the wake of Koon); United States v. Farouil, 124 F.3d 838, 847 (7th 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Charry Cubillos, 91 F.3d 1342, 1344 (9th Cir. 1996); Jason Bent, 
Note, Sentencing Equality for Deportable Aliens:  Departures from the Sentencing 
Guidelines on the Basis of Alienage, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1320, 1338 (2000); see also Koon v. 
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 106–07 (1996); supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text. 
 256. See United States v. Gomez, 431 F.3d 818, 825 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“If Booker’s 
rendering the Guidelines discretionary means anything, it must give a district judge greater 
latitude on these issues [of individual circumstances or hardship] than did Koon.”). 
 257. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 258. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering the 
opinion of the Court in part); supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
 259. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 260. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2010); supra notes 67, 168 and 
accompanying text. 
 261. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006); United States v. Wills, 476 F.3d 103, 107 (2d 
Cir. 2007). 
 262. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C); United States v. Ngatia, 477 F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
 263. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B); Wills, 476 F.3d at 108. 
 264. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 313 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) 
(noting the breadth of plausible interpretations of “unreasonableness” review, from assuring 
merely procedural compliance to maintaining effectively mandatory Guidelines); supra note 
149 and accompanying text. 
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whether alienage consequences moot certain sentencing goals.265  Where 
courts have found such arguments unpersuasive, their common underlying 
themes include notions of inequality where a reduction in sentence is 
premised on alienage alone,266 and a rejection of applying a mitigating 
factor to such a large swath of federal offenders.267
1.  Deportability Does Not Justify a Shorter Sentence 
 
In United States v. Wills,268 the Second Circuit held that deportability is 
not, on its face, an appropriate basis for a sentence reduction.269  In Wills, 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York departed 
downward on the grounds that first, the defendant faced the additional 
punishment of deportation and second, that under § 3553(a), the defendant 
posed no threat to the public because he would be deported.270  The Second 
Circuit reversed both of these judgments.271
Addressing the district court’s assertion that deportation constituted 
additional punishment, the Wills court said little to justify its holding, and 
instead, relied on its 1993 holding in Restrepo, affirming it in light of 
Booker.
 
272  The Restrepo court had reasoned that deportability was likely 
considered by the Commission, given the number of noncitizens in the 
federal criminal system.273  Therefore, deportability would fall within the 
heartland as an inappropriate basis for departure.274  In addition, the 
Restrepo court stated that a downward departure is not “rationally . . . 
capable of remedying”275 the problem caused by deportation for two 
reasons.  First, according to the court, departure does not ease the burdens 
of deportation, but only “advances the day when deportation will occur.”276  
A downward departure would thus “exacerbate rather than remedy 
[deportation’s] harshness.”277  Second, the Restrepo court was concerned 
that a defendant who moves for a downward departure appears to prefer 
deportation to additional time in prison, and cannot logically argue that 
deportation is the worse of the two alternatives.278
After affirming the Restrepo departure logic, the Wills court evaluated 
the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether deportability merited a 
variance.
 
279
 
 265. See supra notes 
  First, it addressed the direct issue raised in the lower court:  
261–63 and accompanying text. 
 266. See infra notes 290, 303–08 and accompanying text. 
 267. See infra notes 273, 306 and accompanying text. 
 268. 476 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 269. Id. at 107. 
 270. Id. at 106 (discussing the district court’s disposition). 
 271. Id. at 107–09. 
 272. Id. at 107 (citing United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
 273. See Restrepo, 999 F.2d at 647; supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 274. Wills, 476 F.3d at 108. 
 275. Restrepo, 999 F.2d at 647. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. See id. 
 279. Wills, 476 F.3d at 107–08. 
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whether deportation itself incapacitated the offender and protected the 
public, thereby reducing the need for the sentence to do so.280  The court 
determined that a deported offender remained capable of causing harm 
within the United States, be it through illegal reentry, border violence, or 
drug trafficking.281  Thus, the court held that without some affirmative, 
individualized basis to believe that the public needed no further protection 
from Wills, his deportability was not a sufficient basis to decrease his 
sentence.282
Next, the court considered deportability’s interaction with another of 
Congress’s sentencing goals:  deterrence.
 
283  Relying again on Restrepo, the 
court reasoned that because some offenders may prefer deportation over 
incarceration, the deterrent character of imprisonment would be weakened 
with a downward variance for deportability.284
The Second Circuit’s rather exacting review of the district court’s 
decision seems to stem from two doctrinal bases.  First is the precept from 
Booker’s remedial opinion that the advisory Guidelines scheme should 
reintroduce some degree of individualization into sentencing.
 
285  The court 
noted that deportability and immigration status are not individual 
characteristics; rather, they are shared by a significant percentage of 
offenders.286  The second is an implicit notion that reasonableness review 
under Booker requires the application of a certain amount of scrutiny to the 
district court’s treatment of the § 3553 factors.287
In United States v. Castro-Rivas,
 
288 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit relied on its pre-Booker law on Guidelines departures, and 
adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning from Wills, to find that considering 
deportability among the § 3553(a) factors was legal error.289  In addition, 
the Castro-Rivas court expressed that it could not support an outcome 
where disparate sentences turned on citizenship status alone.290
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cited procedural 
unreasonableness—rather than the substantive unreasonableness cited by 
Wills—to invalidate consideration of alienage consequences in United 
 
 
 280. Id. (accepting, with some apparent skepticism, the assumption that the “public” 
referred to in § 3553 was only the American public); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) 
(2006). 
 281. Wills, 476 F.3d at 108. 
 282. Id. at 111. 
 283. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B); Wills, 476 F.3d at 108. 
 284. Wills, 476 F.3d at 108. 
 285. See id.; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264–65 (2005) (Breyer, J., 
delivering the opinion of the Court in part). 
 286. See Wills, 476 F.3d at 109.  In United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(en banc), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit limited this part of the Wills 
reasoning. See id. at 191.  Relying on Gall and Kimbrough, the Cavera court noted that 
district courts may permissibly rely on categorizations that apply to classes of offenders 
rather than to individuals. See id. 
 287. See Wills, 476 F.3d at 105. 
 288. 254 F. App’x 742 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 289. Id. at 750. 
 290. Id. at 752. 
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States v. Arroyo Mojica.291  There, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Washington had departed downward because the Guidelines did 
not account for removal’s extraordinary hardship on a person who had spent 
his entire life in the United States.292  The Ninth Circuit reversed.  Relying 
on pre-Booker case law, it held that deportability was a prohibited ground 
for departure where “the possibility of deportation does not speak to the 
offender’s character, culpability or history nor to the seriousness of the 
offense.”293  Finding that the sentencing court did not properly “take 
account” of the Guidelines as commanded by Booker, the court found 
procedural error and remanded for resentencing.294
2.  Courts Cannot Consider More Severe Conditions of Confinement 
 
Circuit courts have relied on equality rationales and separation of power 
arguments in holding that it is inappropriate to reduce a sentence to account 
for more severe conditions of confinement associated with 
noncitizenship.295  For example, in United States v. Telles-Milton,296 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the 
defendant’s contention that the sentencing court erred by failing to 
recognize its authority to decrease his sentence to account for the conditions 
of confinement he would face due to his noncitizen status.297  The Telles-
Milton court affirmed the sentence in reliance on its pre-Booker holding that 
ineligibility for placement in a halfway house cannot justify a downward 
departure.298  The precedent cited, United States v. Veloza,299 held that the 
defendant was not entitled to a downward departure to account for harsher 
conditions of confinement.300  Veloza, in turn, had relied on Restrepo’s 
rationale that a court’s attempt to sidestep BOP policy would impinge upon 
legislative discretion.301
 
 291. 131 F. App’x 80, 81 (9th Cir. 2005).  Arroyo Mojica was decided two months after 
and indeed relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker. See id. 
 
 292. Id. at 82 (discussing the district court’s decision). 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 83 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (Breyer, J., 
delivering the opinion of the Court in part)). 
 295. See infra notes 301, 307 and accompanying text. 
 296. 347 F. App’x 522 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 297. Id. at 523. 
 298. Id. at 525.  Admittedly, the posture of Telles-Milton—where the district judge 
sentenced within the Guidelines range and the defendant appealed his sentence’s 
reasonableness—may have produced a different outcome than if the district judge had varied 
and the government appealed. See supra note 175.  The court nonetheless reiterated in clear 
terms in dicta that the sentencing consequences of alienage do not form the basis for a 
variance. Telles-Milton, 347 F. App’x at 525. 
 299. 83 F.3d 380 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 300. Id. at 382. 
 301. See id.; United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1993).  The Second 
Circuit has similarly reaffirmed this portion of the Restrepo holding under the advisory 
Guidelines regime. See United States v. Duque, 256 F. App’x 436, 438 (2d Cir. 2007); see 
also United States v. Macedo, 406 F.3d 778, 794 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The government is correct 
that the district court based its decision on the BOP’s policy which places alien prisoners in 
certain facilities.”).  Notably, in Macedo, the court relied on Booker with regard to judicial 
fact finding, see id. at 787, but conducted de novo review in reversing the district court’s 
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Likewise, in United States v. Babul,302 the Seventh Circuit rejected the 
notion of an “alienage discount” for those who are imprisoned in the United 
States voluntarily.303  There, the court relied on the Strasbourg 
Convention,304 which allows noncitizen prisoners to be transferred to 
prisons in their country of citizenship, where those prisoners would get the 
benefit of any programs designed to reacclimate citizens.305  The Seventh 
Circuit has referred to similar requests for departures as “stock 
argument[s]” that could be made by every deportable alien,306 and as 
“discrimination in reverse.”307  Though not explicitly stated, it seems that 
the Seventh Circuit’s decisions have been motivated by a belief that the 
BOP’s regulatory power can properly impact a noncitizen’s sentence 
because the fact of noncitizenship makes the disparity a warranted one, 
therefore posing no § 3553(a)(6) problem.308
3.  Future Immigration Detention Cannot Be Offset 
 
The likelihood of future immigration detention poses a particular 
challenge to judges sentencing deportable aliens because it is easily 
analogized to time served, which is often credited.309  The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, in United States v. Arevalo-Caballero,310 
affirmed a sentencing court’s decision not to decrease the defendant’s 
sentence to account for post-incarceration ICE detention.311  The district 
court indicated that it would be “folly” to speculate about a future 
consequence that was not certain to take place.312  Similarly, the Restrepo 
court held that an offset is inappropriate because ICE detention could take 
place regardless of the criminal punishment and is not properly considered 
criminal punishment.313
 
downward departure for alienage consequences, see id. at 794.  This highlights the confusion 
wrought by the Booker opinions. See supra notes 
  The Second Circuit has elsewhere distinguished 
between past incarceration and speculative future incarceration, holding that 
107–11 and accompanying text. 
 302. 476 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 303. Id. at 502. 
 304. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar. 21, 1983, 35 U.S.T. 2867 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4100–15). 
 305. See Babul, 476 F.3d at 502. 
 306. United States v. Mendoza, 576 F.3d 711, 722 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 307. United States v. Meza-Urtado, 351 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 308. See Mendoza, 576 F.3d at 722 (“Every deportable alien would be ineligible to 
participate in certain BOP programs . . . .”); Meza-Urtado, 351 F.3d at 305 (“That the 
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has certain programs for citizen-prisoners, but not deportable 
aliens, does not make the aliens’ imprisonment substantially more onerous than the 
guidelines contemplated in fixing the punishment range for the offense of conviction.”); 
supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 309. See United States v. Montez-Gaviria, 163 F.3d 697, 702 (2d Cir. 1998); supra note 
244 and accompanying text. 
 310. 365 F. App’x 419 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 311. Id. at 423 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 312. See id. (quoting the district judge). 
 313. United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 646 (2d Cir. 1993). 
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potential future incarceration is too uncertain to warrant a downward 
departure.314
B.  Sentencing Courts May Consider the Effects of Noncitizenship 
 
Even prior to Booker, sentencing judges were often moved by the 
particularly harsh nature of deportation when applied to certain long-term 
residents,315 as well as the inherent unfairness of permitting alienage alone 
to create objectively more onerous terms of confinement.316  Under a 
mandatory Guidelines scheme, courts relied on departure analysis, finding 
that such consequences took a particular case outside of the heartland to 
which the Guidelines apply.317  Since Booker, § 3553 variances have 
provided courts an equally apt basis to account for what they perceived to 
be undeserved severity.318
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has treated Booker’s 
grant of increased discretion as the determining factor in considering 
alienage consequences.  In dicta, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that 
 
in the post-Booker era, the defendant’s immigration status could lead a 
sentencing court to two opposite conclusions, one being that potential 
deportation and fewer prison opportunities should be a reason for a 
downward variance.  Conversely, the other conclusion could be that a 
person granted the benefit of entry to the country should be subject to an 
upward variance for abusing the privilege.  In different factual contexts, 
either approach is within the discretion of the sentencing court.319
Recognizing the validity of both sides of the substantive arguments, the 
court noted that neither position is off limits under Booker, so an appellate 
court could not override the sound judgment of the sentencing court on this 
issue.
 
320  In other words, the nature of appellate review—that is, the amount 
of deference the appellate court accords the decision of the district court—
may be determinative of whether consideration of alienage is left to 
stand.321
1.  Deportatability May Justify a Shorter Sentence 
 
In United States v. Ngatia,322 the Seventh Circuit relied on a reduced 
need to incapacitate323 a deportable alien in affirming a variance from the 
Guidelines.324
 
 314. Montez-Gaviria, 163 F.3d at 702. 
  There, the court found that deportation negated the need for 
incarceration to perform a function in protecting the public, stating, 
 315. See infra notes 332–34 and accompanying text. 
 316. See infra notes 342, 346–48 and accompanying text. 
 317. See infra notes 332–34, 342, 345, 353–59 and accompanying text. 
 318. See infra note 322–30, 359–61 and accompanying text. 
 319. United States v. Petrus, 588 F.3d 347, 356 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 320. See id. 
 321. See id.; supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 322. 477 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 323. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
 324. Ngatia, 477 F.3d at 502. 
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“[c]onsidering that it is almost certain that Ngatia will be deported 
following her release, she will be incapacitated from further drug 
importation to the United States.”325  The Seventh Circuit also stressed the 
discretion afforded to sentencing judges and the consequent need for only 
minimal appellate review.326
Section 3553(a)’s command to consider a defendant’s characteristics 
similarly provides an avenue for considering alienage consequences.
  By saying little else on the subject, the 
Seventh Circuit seemingly gave considerable deference to the district 
court’s analysis of § 3553. 
327  In 
United States v. Loaiza-Sanchez,328 the sentencing court found that illegal 
presence was an aggravating factor sufficient to justify sentencing the 
defendant at a higher point within the Guidelines range.329  The defendant 
appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that 
alienage is properly considered as part of the defendant’s “history and 
characteristics.”330
Both pre- and post-Booker, courts have used Guidelines departure 
analysis to account for alienage consequences.
 
331  The Ferreria court found 
that loss of family is not adequately accounted for in the Guidelines.332  The 
court relied on United States v. Agu,333 a pre-Restrepo decision where the 
sentencing court departed downward for a defendant who, due to his 
military service, was entitled to become a citizen but never did, and whose 
imminent separation from his wife and child thus constituted mitigating 
circumstances warranting a downward departure.334
The argument that deportation is punishment is supported by scholarship 
that maintains that the traditional view of deportation as a civil measure is 
out of touch with reality and that deportation is a particularly harsh 
penalty.
 
335  Moreover, the common instinct that the sheer cost of 
incarceration336
 
 325. Id. 
 justifies shorter terms for deportable aliens because the 
 326. See id. at 501–02. 
 327. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (requiring sentencing courts to consider “the history and 
characteristics of the defendant”). 
 328. 622 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 329. See id. at 940 (referring to the district court’s decision).  The district court did not 
depart or issue a variance from the Guidelines; rather, it used alienage as a basis for 
movement within the Guidelines range. Id. 
 330. Id. at 942 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006)). 
 331. See supra notes 99, 168 and accompanying text. 
 332. See United States v. Ferreria, 239 F. Supp. 2d 849, 857 (E.D. Wis. 2002). 
 333. 763 F. Supp. 703 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 334. Id. at 704. 
 335. See Pauw, supra note 221, at 306 (calling removal “an extremely cruel 
punishment”). 
 336. See BUREAU OF PRISONS, FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM PER CAPITA COSTS 1 (2009), 
available at http://www.bop.gov/foia/fy09_per_capita_costs.pdf (reporting that in 2009, it 
cost an average of $24,751 to incarcerate one person); JOHN SCHMITT ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. 
& POLICY RESEARCH, THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION 8, 10 (2010) (arguing 
that more severe sentencing policy for drug offenses in particular, and not an increase in 
crime, explains the drastic rise in rates of U.S. incarceration since the mid-1980s, and noting 
that in 2008, incarceration cost state, local, and the federal governments close to $75 billion). 
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expenditure seems futile has received some judicial attention, but has not 
been found persuasive.337  At least one state government has taken steps to 
incorporate cost into sentencing policy,338 but the federal Guidelines only 
consider cost effectiveness in cases involving the elderly or “seriously 
infirm.”339
2.  Courts May Consider More Severe Conditions of Confinement 
 
A decade before Booker, the D.C. Circuit broke away from the Restrepo 
pack and held, in United States v. Smith,340 that a sentencing court may 
depart downward in anticipation of the harsher conditions of confinement 
that a noncitizen faces in prison.341  The court acknowledged Restrepo but, 
relying on a broad definition of “mitigating circumstances” under the 
Guidelines, disagreed with Restrepo’s finding that a sentencing court does 
not have the discretion to sidestep BOP policies.342  Notably, the dissenting 
judge in Smith argued that the Smith majority imposed an overly 
individualized sentence, inconsistent with the dictates of the SRA and the 
then-mandatory Guidelines.343
Several courts have followed the primary Smith holding, allowing 
departures where conditions are such that they punish beyond the level that 
the Commission contemplated.  Generally, these courts seem to grapple 
with what constitutes an unwarranted disparity,
 
344 and often, when they 
determine that alienage is the sole cause of a difference in sentence, they 
depart or issue a variance.  The Seventh Circuit in United States v. 
Guzman345 permitted a departure to account for unduly arduous conditions 
of confinement, noting that those conditions may be outside the Guidelines’ 
contemplation, but not for deportability, rejecting the notion that it 
constitutes “double punishment.”346  Similarly, in United States v. Pacheco-
Soto,347
 
 337. See United States v. Loaiza-Sanchez, 622 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 2010) (Bright, J., 
dissenting) (“[L]ong sentences for illegal aliens punish not only the defendant but the 
American taxpayer.  ‘It would be more sensible to give . . . a stiff, but shorter sentence and 
then to promptly deport him . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Chavez, 230 F.3d 1089, 1092 
(8th Cir. 2000) (Bright, J., concurring))); United States v. Maldonado, 242 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 
2001) (referencing a statement by the district court that “the real reason I’m going to depart 
downward here is because I don’t want the taxpayers to pay for him unnecessarily”). 
 decided just after Booker, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
New Mexico characterized a noncitizen inmate’s ineligibility for early 
release, lack of access to a minimum security facility, and lack of lenience 
 338. See Monica Davey, Touching Off Debate, Missouri Tells Judges Cost of Sentences, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at A1. 
 339. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1, 5H1.4 (2010). 
 340. 27 F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 341. See id. at 653–55; U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (permitting departures from the Guidelines 
where mitigating or aggravating circumstances exist). 
 342. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 654; cf. United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 645–46 (2d 
Cir. 1993). 
 343. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 656 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
 344. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text. 
 345. 236 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 346. Id. at 834. 
 347. 386 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (D.N.M. 2005). 
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for participation in drug treatment as “severe and unfair” and found that 
those factors formed a sufficient basis to justify a downward departure.348
In United States v. Bautista,
 
349 the Seventh Circuit permitted departure 
where the defendant, a resident alien, faced deportation to Peru where he 
had no friends and his only family was his abusive father.350  The court 
reasoned around the logical inconsistencies that had troubled the Restrepo 
court, arguing that “the apparent paradox [that departure merely hastens 
deportation] disappears if one views the departure not as remedying the 
consequences of deportation, but as an offset to those consequences.”351  
The court further noted that “nothing in the Guidelines . . . forbids 
consideration of extralegal consequences that follow a sentence as grounds 
for a departure.”352
Relying on Smith, two district courts have found that where alien status 
alone leads to a substantial increase in the severity of a sentence, departure 
is appropriate.  The U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont in 
United States v. Simalavong
 
353 held that where Canadian citizenship was 
the only reason a defendant would be incarcerated, the case fell outside of 
Restrepo’s general prohibition because of how exceptional the particular 
hardship was.354  There, the defendant’s offense score subjected him to 
probation and community confinement; as a noncitizen, he was ineligible 
for that form of punishment, and his conviction thus mandated 
imprisonment.355  The sentencing court found that where alienage alone 
made the difference between an incarceratory and a non-incarceratory 
sentence, the case fell outside the heartland, and departed downward in 
order to impose the sentence that it would have imposed on a citizen.356  
Similarly, in United States v. Bakeas,357 the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts departed downward where, if the defendant were 
a citizen, he would have served his sentence in a minimum security prison 
camp, but as a noncitizen was ineligible for placement in that more lenient 
type of facility.358  The court noted that a “downward departure [can be] 
appropriate when a defendant’s non-citizenship is more than collateral to 
his sentence but instead threatens to change the nature of the entire 
sentence.”359
 
 348. Id. at 1205; see also United States v. Jiang, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1157 (D.N.M. 
2005) (stating, without indicating its rationale, that the court may consider deportation in 
issuing a variance). 
  The court also found that § 3553(a)’s instruction to consider 
 349. 258 F.3d 602 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 350. Id. at 604–05. 
 351. Id. at 606. 
 352. Id. 
 353. 924 F. Supp. 610 (D. Vt. 1995). 
 354. Id. at 613 (distinguishing the court’s decision from the general rule of Restrepo). 
 355. Id. at 611; see supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
 356. See Simalavong, 924 F. Supp. at 613. 
 357. 987 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mass. 1997). 
 358. See id. at 44 (sentencing the defendant to the “functional equivalent” of the sentence 
a U.S. citizen would have received). 
 359. Id. at 48. 
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the “kinds of sentences available”360 required it to consider conditions of 
confinement.361
According to the D.C. Circuit, departure to evade harsher conditions does 
not infringe impermissibly upon BOP discretion.
 
362  The Smith court 
reasoned that generally, it will be difficult to determine which factors 
impact placement given the BOP’s “almost illimitable” discretion.363  In 
some cases, however, the court was concerned that the restrictions on 
noncitizens were imposed strictly as a proxy for flight risk—in other words, 
that alienage alone creates the increased severity—and a downward 
departure may be appropriate.364
3.  The Guidelines Do Not Forbid Accounting for Future, Related 
Incarceration 
 
Applying broad deference to the district court’s sentencing decisions, a 
Seventh Circuit panel in United States v. Arowosaye365 found that the 
silence in the Guidelines was sufficient to permit a downward departure 
where a defendant faced likely incarceration upon being deported to 
Nigeria.366  The court found that because the Guidelines do not prohibit 
consideration of future detention, the sentencing court had the discretion to 
account for it with a downward departure.367  The Arowosaye court left the 
decision of whether to account for speculative detention to the district 
court’s discretion.368
III.  INTERPRETING BOOKER AND ITS PROGENY TO CREATE A MORE 
COMPASSIONATE SENTENCING REGIME 
 
Throughout the Guidelines’ history, courts have disagreed over whether 
alienage can form the basis for a downward departure under section 5K2.0 
or a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553.  This Note argues that the Supreme 
Court’s post-Booker line of cases indicates that district courts have the 
discretion to consider the consequences of alienage in crafting a sentence.  
Furthermore, this Note encourages the Commission to incorporate 
consideration of alienage consequences into the Guidelines to promote the 
SRA’s goal of increased uniformity in sentences. 
Part III.A of this Note addresses Booker’s conflicting commands on 
appellate review of sentencing decisions, arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
 
 360. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3) (2006). 
 361. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. at 49. 
 362. See United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  But see United States 
v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that a court’s attempt to cure its 
disagreement with BOP policy would overstep the judicial role). 
 363. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 655. 
 364. See id. 
 365. 112 F. App’x 528 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 366. Id. at 532. 
 367. Id. at 532; see also Symposium, supra note 52, at 9–10 (statement of Hon. Nancy 
Gertner) (suggesting that a person who has spent several months in immigration detention 
may deserve a downward departure to account for that time served “essentially in custody”). 
 368. See Arowosaye, 112 F. App’x at 533. 
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Guidelines jurisprudence trends toward greater district court discretion and 
less scrutinizing appellate review, which is at odds with Congress’s 
sentencing goals as expressed in the SRA.  Part III.B argues that as a result 
of this tension, the Commission should adopt a recommendation within the 
Guidelines that allows district judges to consider the consequences of 
noncitizenship in sentencing.  Placing a recommendation squarely within 
the Guidelines would obviate Congress’s concerns about excessive judicial 
discretion, increase sentencing uniformity, and be consistent with both 
Padilla v. Kentucky and recent Guidelines amendments.  Part III.C 
recommends a path for consideration of alienage consequences under 
§ 3553(a) in the absence of a specific Guideline. 
A.  The Goals of the SRA and the Supreme Court’s Post-Booker 
Jurisprudence Are Irreconcilable 
For all the uncertainty about what the SRA and the Guidelines intend to 
promote,369 no doubt exists that they sought to increase consistency and 
decrease disparities in sentencing.370  To accomplish these goals, Congress 
restricted judicial discretion,371 which arguably existed in excess prior to 
the enactment of the SRA,372 and replaced it with a mandatory model for 
arriving at a sentence.  After Booker, the model remains, but judicial 
discretion has been reintroduced into the sentencing process.373  The post-
Booker trajectory indicates that the Court is struggling to maintain Booker’s 
two holdings.374  It recognizes that Booker’s merits opinion gave 
sentencing judges very broad discretion,375 but the remedy curbed that 
discretion with appellate review in order to promote uniformity, adhere to 
Congress’s sentencing goals,376
This irreconcilability is reflected in the different ways that circuit courts 
have treated lower court decisions considering alienage in sentencing.
 and maintain the continuing validity of the 
Guidelines. 
377  
The difference among the circuit courts that find that immigration 
consequences may not be considered378 and those that find that they may379 
seems to rest fundamentally upon conflicting visions of the role of appellate 
review under Booker.380
Booker espouses two primary schools of thought on the nature of 
appellate review.
 
381
 
 369. See supra notes 
  The merits opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, holds 
41–49 and accompanying text. 
 370. See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text. 
 371. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 372. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
 373. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 374. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 375. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 376. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 377. See supra Part II. 
 378. See supra Part II.A. 
 379. See supra Part II.B. 
 380. See infra notes 382–90 and accompanying text. 
 381. See infra notes 382–85, 388–90 and accompanying text. 
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that judicial fact-finding that leads to an increase in sentencing range is 
impermissible under the Sixth Amendment.382  An outgrowth of this 
holding is that searching appellate review would make the Guidelines more 
persuasive by pressuring a judge to sentence within the Guidelines.383  The 
constraint of appellate review thus calls into question the constitutionality 
of substantive appellate sentencing review.384  In other words, Justice 
Stevens’s opinion countenances very limited appellate review of 
sentencing, deferring instead to the district court’s discretion to properly 
balance factors.385
On the other hand, Justice Breyer’s remedial opinion makes the 
Guidelines advisory rather than wholly voluntary.
 
386  The Guidelines 
calculation is a required consideration and first step in the sentencing 
process.387  The remedial opinion stresses the uniformity Congress sought 
in passing the SRA388 and thus requires the use of reasonableness review to 
maintain that uniformity.389  Under the remedial holding, the § 3553(a) 
factors must form a basis for appellate review.390
While from a pragmatic point of view it may be plausible to carve out a 
middle road that reconciles these two holdings,
 
391 from a doctrinal 
standpoint, they are arguably incompatible.392  In its post-Booker holdings, 
the Court has generally—though not consistently393—recognized and 
deferred to the primacy of judicial discretion in sentencing.394  Since 
Booker, the Court has held that a district court level presumption that the 
Guidelines are reasonable395 and appellate requirements of 
proportionality396 in variances do not comport with the advisory Guidelines 
scheme.  In these decisions, the Court returned a significant amount of 
discretion to sentencing judges.397
 
 382. See supra note 
 
94 and accompanying text. 
 383. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering the 
opinion of the Court in part) (noting that more scrutinizing de novo review under the 
PROTECT Act made the Guidelines “more mandatory”). 
 384. See Shapiro & Seltzer, supra note 175, at 177. 
 385. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 311–12 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 386. See id. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). 
 387. See supra notes 98, 167 and accompanying text. 
 388. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 253 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). 
 389. See supra note 141–43 and accompanying text. 
 390. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 391. See Richard G. Kopf, The Top Ten Things I Learned from Apprendi, Blakely, 
Booker, Rita, Kimbrough and Gall, OSJCL AMICI:  VIEWS FROM THE FIELD 1, 1 (Jan. 2008), 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcl/blog/Articles_1/kopf-final-12-28-07.pdf (comparing Justice 
Ginsburg’s signing onto both Booker opinions to Orwellian “Doublethink,” or “the power of 
holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of 
them”). 
 392. See supra notes 111, 171 and accompanying text. 
 393. See supra notes 133, 152 and accompanying text. 
 394. See supra notes 125–26, 128, 148 and accompanying text. 
 395. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 396. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 397. See supra notes 115–28 and accompanying text. 
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Judicial discretion, however, is precisely what Congress sought to limit 
in passing the SRA.398  Judicial discretion is, in some ways, in conflict with 
Congress’s explicit goal of increased uniformity.399  These conflicting 
directives for appellate review under § 3553 underlie the circuit split this 
Note addresses, wherein some courts of appeals reverse a lower court’s 
consideration of alienage consequences while others permit them to 
stand.400  The trend in the Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence since 
2005 reveals that it currently prefers the more permissive model.401  In 
other words, as it is within the district court’s discretion to determine when 
alienage consequences should impact a sentence, those circuits that deferred 
to a district judge’s finding that alienage consequences may merit a 
variance402
The risk to judges, however, is that if Congress senses an unsavory return 
to the pre-SRA level of discretion and disparity, it may respond with 
constitutional sentencing reforms that remove discretion once again.
 seem to better comply with the Supreme Court’s post-Booker 
pronouncements. 
403  As 
the experience with the Feeney Amendment demonstrated, federal judges 
bristle at the removal of discretion if it makes them feel that their hands are 
tied to mete out unjust, if legal, sentences.404
B.  The Guidelines Should Recognize Deportability as a Basis for 
Downward Departures 
  Accordingly, this Note 
advocates relying on more than judicial discretion to take account of 
alienage consequences. 
Although courts can account for alienage consequences through the 
exercise of judicial discretion, amending the Guidelines to account for those 
consequences would be a superior way to administer these factors, as it 
would better comply with the goals of the SRA405 and the dictates of 
Booker.406
 
 398. See supra notes 
  A Guidelines amendment would provide a more systematic 
30–36 and accompanying text. 
 399. See supra notes 33, 142–55 and accompanying text. 
 400. See supra notes 285–87, 319–20, 326 and accompanying text. 
 401. See supra notes 115–34 and accompanying text; see also Lynch, supra note 142, at 4 
(arguing that Kimbrough indicates that the Court has trended toward interpreting Booker to 
provide more sentencing court discretion). 
 402. See supra Part II.B. 
 403. See Berman, supra note 93, at 357 (discussing former Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales’s proposal to respond to Booker with mandatory minimum guidelines); Kate Stith, 
The Arc of the Pendulum:  Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE 
L.J. 1420, 1495–96 & n.329 (2008) (discussing the possibility that Congress could modify 
the structure of mandatory minimums to rein in judicial sentencing discretion); see also 
JUDGES’ SURVEY, supra note 107, tbl.16 (finding that 33% of district court judges believe 
that mandatory minimums are the leading cause of disparities in sentencing, whereas only 
11% think that judicial discretion is the primary cause); supra notes 87–89 and 
accompanying text. 
 404. See supra note 89. 
 405. See Berman, supra note 93, at 376 (arguing that the Commission—not Congress or 
the courts—is the body best suited to make changes to sentencing practice); supra notes 33–
46 and accompanying text. 
 406. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
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methodology for district courts to factor in alienage, and would help resolve 
the circuit split created by spotty treatment of such factors under § 3553. 
While a Guidelines provision would not bind any judge, it would have 
two decisive advantages over the current method of relying on § 3553.  
First, it could provide judges with a suggested points value for 
deportability, thereby encouraging uniformity in the size of any offset.407  
Second, it would permit the offset to occur within the Guidelines 
calculation, rather than outside of it, which would subject it to less 
searching appellate review.408
Empirical evidence suggests that the judiciary would support an alienage 
amendment.  In a 2010 survey of district court judges, 62% of judges 
indicated that family ties and responsibilities are a relevant consideration in 
a departure or variance, and 49% indicated that community ties are 
relevant.
 
409  Only 2% and 5% of judges thought that those considerations 
were never relevant, respectively.410  Those two qualities—family and 
community ties—approximate what deportability accounts for,411 because 
they are precisely what is lost to a deported alien who has built a life in the 
United States.412
An amendment would also be consistent with the recent Guidelines 
changes that recognize the particular burdens on noncitizens.
 
413  The 
cultural assimilation amendment specifically addresses the hardship that 
deportation exacts on those with significant family and community ties.414  
The amendment to the Guidelines that sanctioned fast track departures, and 
the proposed amendment for stipulation to deportation, speak primarily to 
the resources saved when a criminal alien cooperates with his removal,415
 
 407. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K3.1 (2010) (authorizing a 
departure of as many as four points for fast track programs); see also Letter from Carissa 
Byrne Hessick, Assoc. Professor, Sandra Day O’Connor Coll. of Law, Ariz. State Univ., to 
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 1 (Mar. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20100317/ASU.pdf 
(encouraging the Commission to amend the Guidelines to include a factor that is already 
taken into account under § 3553(a) analysis to promote uniformity). 
 
rather than on the inherent fairness of his sentence.  Nonetheless, these 
changes indicate, at the very least, that the Commission is willing to take 
notice of deportability in sentencing, and that at minimum, some situations 
 408. See supra notes 117, 173–75 and accompanying text. 
 409. JUDGES’ SURVEY, supra note 107, tbl.13. 
 410. Id. 
 411. See Cynthia Hujar Orr, Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Lawyers, Statement Before the 
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 3 (Mar. 17, 2010) (arguing that a downward departure for 
consequences of alienage would be consistent with U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6, which directs 
sentencing courts to look at an offender’s family ties and responsibilities); supra notes 183–
84 and accompanying text. 
 412. See supra notes 332–34 and accompanying text. 
 413. See supra notes 182–89 and accompanying text. 
 414. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.  Of course, a fundamental difference 
between the cultural assimilation amendment and this discussion is that the amendment 
provides a departure where community ties were the motivation for the crime, whereas here 
such a loss is a consequence of the crime. 
 415. See supra notes 91, 186–89 and accompanying text. 
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counsel a shorter sentence because of it.  They also suggest that the legal 
fiction that deportation is not punitive is not an obstacle to considering 
deportation at sentencing. 
Padilla v. Kentucky partially dismantled a significant doctrinal obstacle 
to considering deportability in sentencing.  While Restrepo and the cases 
that followed it relied on the formalism that deportation is separate from 
criminal punishment,416 Padilla states that, to the contrary, immigration 
consequences are not only properly considered at the sentencing stage, but 
must be considered to satisfy a defendant’s right to effective counsel.417  To 
be sure, this Note contemplates a broad reading of Padilla, which only dealt 
with state, not federal, sentencing.  While Padilla did not go so far as to 
reject outright the notion that deportation is not criminal punishment, it 
unquestionably anticipates the serious impact that deportation can have on a 
defendant, and seems to poke holes in the legal fiction that deportation is 
not punishment.418  Given other admissions of the Supreme Court to the 
effect that deportation can be so severe as to constitute punishment,419
Undeniably, there are counterarguments that this solution must confront.  
The most salient challenge is that it is unfair to give a noncitizen a shorter 
sentence than a citizen who has committed the same crime,
 
arguing to the contrary envisages an uphill battle. 
420 and that 
considering these consequences actually creates a sentencing disparity.421
A corollary to this argument is that there is something unfair about 
shortening the sentence of a person who, in addition to committing a crime, 
has concomitantly violated the terms of his immigration status.
  
That argument is circular because it assumes that immigration 
consequences do not contribute to the punishment imposed. 
422  
However, in the case of a legal resident at sentencing, something is also 
being taken away from that person that is not taken away from an otherwise 
identical citizen, namely his earned privilege of being in the United States 
and his ability to return to his family at the end of his prison term.423  Some 
may argue that it is inappropriate to shorten a sentence simply to offset the 
application of U.S. law.424  What this Note proposes, however, is not very 
different from what Kimbrough allowed—permitting the sentencing court 
to recognize when a penalty that the law imposes is simply too harsh to be 
reconciled with § 3553(a).425
 
 416. See supra notes 
 
218–22 and accompanying text. 
 417. See supra notes 227–29 and accompanying text. 
 418. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (“Although removal 
proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal 
process.” (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984))). 
 419. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 420. See supra notes 303–08 and accompanying text. 
 421. See supra notes 106, 180 and accompanying text. 
 422. See supra notes 307, 319 and accompanying text. 
 423. See supra notes 198, 221 and accompanying text. 
 424. See, e.g., United States v. Wills, 476 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]reating the 
mere application of immigration law as the basis for a non-Guidelines sentence . . . flouts the 
goal of individualized justice . . . .”). 
 425. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
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This Note does not advocate for an automatic downward departure for 
deportability426 such that every noncitizen defendant would get a shorter 
sentence than a similarly situated U.S. citizen.427  Rather, this Note argues 
that defendants who demonstrably suffer a harsher penalty because of their 
alienage status are entitled to have that consequence considered.  A sizeable 
percentage of federal offenders may face these consequences,428 and thus it 
behooves the criminal justice system to devise a consistent and uniform 
way to address those consequences, rather than adhering to the haphazard 
method that currently exists.429
C.  Deportable Offenders Can Be Granted Relief Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 
 
In the absence of modification to the Guidelines, courts are nonetheless 
permitted to account for alienage consequences.  Two provisions of the 
SRA indicate that alienage consequences should be considered at 
sentencing.  First, the SRA obliges sentencing judges to consider the 
“history and characteristics of the defendant.”430  That requirement puts 
alienage directly before the sentencing judge.431  As the Eighth Circuit has 
noted, alienage and the consequences of deportation fit squarely into that 
statute, and as such, courts are obligated to consider them.432  Likewise, 
deportation can be “the most important part” of the criminal sanction for a 
defendant433 and therefore, should be taken into consideration among the 
defendant’s other relevant characteristics.  The difference between the pre-
Booker mandatory Guidelines and the post-Booker advisory Guidelines is 
the change in primary focus from the Guidelines calculation to the dictates 
of § 3553, and, as one district judge has stated, unlike the Guidelines, 
§ 3553 “allows judges to consider everything that is important in sentencing 
a defendant.”434
Further, the parsimony principal that restrains every sentence, demanding 
sentences that are “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to accomplish 
the goals of punishment,
 
435 counsels toward considering alienage 
consequences insofar as they impose additional punishment.  Following 
Padilla,436
 
 426. Such a proposal may, however, be permissible under some courts’ interpretations of 
Kimbrough. See supra note 
 if immigration consequences are properly considered at 
sentencing, then arguably they are properly considered in the calculus of 
what constitutes sufficient, but not greater than necessary punishment.  
126. 
 427. See supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
 428. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
 429. See supra Part II. 
 430. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006). 
 431. See Lynch, supra note 142, at 6 (“But whatever guidelines do not capture—and the 
Guidelines capture almost nothing about individual character and circumstances—must be 
the preserve of [the sentencing judge’s] discretion.”). 
 432. See supra notes 328–30 and accompanying text. 
 433. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010). 
 434. Symposium, supra note 52, at 4 (statement of Hon. Lynn Adelman). 
 435. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 436. See supra notes 226–29 and accompanying text. 
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Therefore, when a defendant can show that deportation, lack of access to 
prison benefits, and prolonged immigration detention will increase the 
severity of his sentence, § 3553 requires offsetting those factors to avoid 
violating the parsimony principal. 
CONCLUSION 
Every year, thousands of noncitizens face terms of incarceration that are 
qualitatively different than the prison terms served by similarly situated 
U.S. citizens.  Conflicting views on how properly to punish those 
confronting these penalties undermine Congress’s objective of uniformity 
in sentencing.  The failure to take account of alienage consequences creates 
needlessly burdensome sentences for a sizeable group of people in violation 
of the statutory requirement that parsimony guide federal sentencing.  
Sentencing courts can and should take deportability and its attendant 
consequences into account in crafting a sentence, upon a finding that 
demonstrably more severe punishment is the result of those consequences.  
However, rather than promote reliance solely upon the broad dictates of 
§ 3553, the Commission should explicitly recognize alienage consequences 
as a proper basis for a sentence reduction because the Commission’s 
imprimatur would increase uniformity, satisfying Congress’s policy aims.  
Likewise, accounting for alienage consequences within the initial 
Guidelines calculation makes that consideration subject to less searching 
appellate scrutiny, consistent with Booker’s return of discretion to the 
sentencing judge. 
 
